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I. CIVIL AND MILITARY INTERFACEO N FEBRUARY 5, 1997, a National Guard F-16 was operat-
ing in a warning area airspace established over the Atlantic
Ocean when it intercepted Nations Air flight 70, a Boeing 727,
which was crossing the warning area following an IFR flight
plan. The Nations Air flight 70 was a chartered flight originat-
ing from San Juan, Puerto Rico en route to J.F.K International
Airport in New York. Seventy-seven passengers and seven crew
members were on board.2 The close proximity of these two
planes activated the B-727's Traffic Collision and Alert System
(TCAS), which obliged the B-727's flight crew to execute ma-
neuvers in response to the TCAS Resolution Advisories.' Both
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the De-
partment of Defense (DOD) cooperated in investigating this in-
cident. One conclusion from this joint investigation was that
some confusion existed over the class identification of off shore
airspace, the status of warning areas, and the applicability of op-
erating rules and standards to such situations.4 The NTSB rec-
ommended that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
develop, in cooperation with the DOD, a formal document that
would clearly define the roles and responsibilities of each
2 See 97 NTSB REP. 113 (1997), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/brief.
asp?evid=20010108X00058&Reg=1.
-1 See Warning Areas and Offshore Airspace, 99-3 AIR TRAFFIC BULL. 7(1999), availa-
ble at http://www.faa.gov/ATpubs/ATB/99-3.htm. The 727 executed a descent
followed by two separate instructions to climb. See NTSB REP., supra note 2.
4 97 NTSB REP. 112, available at http://www.ntsb.gov.
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agency concerning Special Use Airspace (SUA).5 On January
1998, representatives of the FAA, DOD, and National Air Traffic
Controllers Association held a meeting to review SUA guidance.
Concerns identified pertained to communication, coordination
procedures, and responsibilities for the separation of aircrafts in
such situations. As a result, the FAA, in conjunction with the
DOD, which included representatives of the Office of the Assis-
tant Secretary of Defense for Command Control, Communica-
tions and Intelligence, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Air Force, and the
U.S. Army, issued Air Traffic Bulletin 99-3 titled "Warning Areas
and Offshore Airspace." Air Traffic Bulletin 99-3 is now a
mandatory briefing and training item for controllers.6 This bul-
letin was also provided to the DOD for distribution and briefing.
The incident was closed following the Safety Recommendation
A-97-113.
Although no damages resulted from this incident, the fact re-
mains that civil and state airplanes share a common airspace
and that their interaction is an ineluctable reality of our epoch.
Air traffic safety can only be achieved through a close coopera-
tion of all who use the air medium.
On the global level, a minimum civil-military regulatory inter-
face within the international legal matrix is a necessary prereq-
uisite to creating safe skies. Present and past international legal
instruments regulating air transportation and navigation have
almost exclusively dealt with civil or commercial aviation, practi-
cally excluding military aircraft from their scope of applicability.
Although the legal status of state aircraft, including military
aircraft has not been specifically dealt with in international trea-
ties, it has not been completely ignored either. This note will
examine international norms of conventional and customary or-
igin regulating the flight of military aircraft as a subset of state
aircraft. While our analysis will concentrate on the legal status
during peacetime, certain legal aspects of air operations during
times of armed conflict will also be discussed.
International public air law instruments have a conceptual tra-
dition based upon a theory of functionalism. Air law perceives
the flight of an aircraft through a conceptual paradigm, which
creates a regulatory distinction between the flight of a state air-
craft and the flight of a civil aircraft. Our contemporary legal
5 See NTSB REP., supra note 4.
6 The FAA also revised certain paragraphs in Order 7110.65, "Air Traffic Con-
trol," effective February 24, 2000.
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instruments are loyal to this bifilar tradition maintaining the use
of dichotomously structuring norms based on two classes of air-
craft. These regulatory poles are either civil aviation on one
hand and state aircraft on the other. The activity, purpose, or
task being accomplished during the flight of an aircraft will de-
termine the applicable norms. Thus, within the corpus of inter-
national public air law, the rights and duties, which affect the
flight of an aircraft, are contingent upon its function. As func-
tion remains the fulcrum of a delicate legal balance, the proper
determination of the function gains, to say the least, in impor-
tance. How does one determine the function of the flight of an
aircraft? What attributes of a flight may be used to qualify the
activity, purpose, or task of the flight of an aircraft? In establish-
ing this function the registration of the aircraft is certainly very
useful but does not establish an irrevocable determination of
the function of a flight. Thus, the flight of an aircraft can be
either of a public or private activity, irrespective of its registra-
tion.7 Furthermore, ownership by itself is also not recognized in
international treaties as an attribute irrevocably determining the
civil or public nature of an aircraft's flight. Again, ownership,
like the registration of an aircraft, can certainly be an element of
proof in determining the function of a flight, but they are, by
themselves, insufficient to ineluctably establish the functional
nature of the flight of an aircraft.
State aircraft are mainly composed of military aircraft. How-
ever, a caveat must now be mentioned. In dealing with matters
of military activities of states, customary norms can be difficult to
ascertain. International customary norms have a bipartite con-
struction. Customs are composed of a material act and of a psy-
chological element called opinio iuris et necessitatis.* Practice and
opino iuris et necessitatis are often difficult to discern in military
matters as the practice and motivations of states are quite often
obscured and shrouded within a penumbral veil of national se-
curity and hence, secrecy. Nonetheless, we argue that national
military manuals, military orders, and unclassified peacetime
rules of engagement are all indicative of the opinio iuris et neces-
sitatis of states on these matters.
7 See NGUYEN Quoc DINH, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 1200 (6th ed. 1999).
8 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 4-8 (3d ed.
1979); see also Asylum (Colom./Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20).
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The International Court of Justice (ICJ) had initially estab-
lished a strict approach in proving opinio iuris et necessitates,9 es-
tablishing that opinio iuris et necessitatis cannot be inferred from
practice alone. However, in a more recent decision,"' the ICJ
did show more flexibility by stating that opinio iuris et necessitatis
can be determined by using, among other things, UN General
Assembly (UNGA) resolutions or statements made by state rep-
resentatives. This case also establishes a methodological differ-
ence from the Lotus and North Sea" cases in that opinio iuris et
necessitatis can be established prior to appraising practice. This
element is important in evaluating military activities as practice
presupposes orders. Consequently, in light of these ICJ deci-
sions, we proffer that it is reasonable to argue that, in establish-
ing customary norms of international air law or in determining
proper treaty interpretation of the Chicago Convention, resolu-
tions of the assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation (ICAO) have, to say the least, probative value. Granted,
opinio iuris necessitatis and opinio iuris generalis are not the same
concepts. UNGA resolutions and ICAO Assembly Resolutions
are an expression of opinio iuris generalis. Other factors must also
be considered in determining the effect of opinio iuris generalis in
proving opinio iuris et necessitatis. These elements are, for exam-
ple, the concordance of state practice with the opinio iuris gener-
alis, unanimity of the vote, the fundamental nature of the
resolution, elementary considerations of humanity as in aircraft
interception, and persistent objectors.'
II. TREATY OF PARIS
The issue of state aircraft within international legal instru-
ments can be traced to the 1910 International Air Navigation
Conference. Article 46 of the Draft Convention provided that
military aircraft, which are legitimately within or above foreign
territory, should enjoy the privilege of extraterritoriality. The
1) See Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.) 1957 I.C.J. 9 (July 6); see also SIR
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTER-
NATIONAL COURT 380 (1958).
H, See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 392 (Nov. 26).
11 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3
(Feb. 20); Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.) 1957 I.CJ. 9 (July 6).
12 See Tea L. Stein, The Approach of a Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persis-
tent Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 457 (1985);Jonathan J. Char-
ney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International Law,
56 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1985).
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first codification of public international air law originated in
Paris with the Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation of
October 13, 1919.: The Paris Convention recognized a distinc-
tion in public international law between "private aircraft" and
"State aircraft" within the following articles, namely:
Article XXX - The following shall be deemed to be State
aircraft:
(a) Military Aircraft;
(b) Aircraft exclusively employed in a State service, such as posts,
customs, police.
Every other aircraft shall be deemed to be a private aircraft.
All State aircraft other than military, customs and police air-
craft shall be treated as private aircraft and as such shall be
subject to all the provisions of the present Convention.
Article XXXI - Every aircraft commanded by a person in mili-
tary service detailed for the purpose shall be deemed to be a mili-
tary aircraft. 4
Within the Paris Convention, each state granted, during
peacetime, the freedom of innocent passage through its sovereign
airspace to the aircraft of other contracting states. The exercise
of this freedom was not contingent upon nationality.' It is im-
1-3 See Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation of 1919, Oct. 13,
1919, 11 L.N.T.S. 173 (hereinafter Paris Convention).
"I Id. at arts. 30-31. Identical provisions were contained in the Ibero-American
Convention on Air Navigation signed in Madrid on November 1, 1926 (Chapter
VI) and in the Pan-American Convention on Commercial Navigation signed in
Havana on February 20, 1928. See 47 U.S.T. 1901. Each convention was super-
seded tinder Article 80 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed
December 7, 1944. See Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944,
61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295. The effect of repudiation of Article 80 is limited
to the norms contained within these treaties which, at the time, had not been
elevated to customary international law. Norms contained within these conven-
tions, which had been universally accepted as customary norms, have an indepen-
dent existence to these treaties and survive the effect of Article 80. We argue that
the norms that applied sovereign immunity and extraterritoriality to State aircraft
are norms which, in fact, had reached the level of customary law and survived the
effects of Article 80. Although the content of the customary norm and the treaty
norm can be identical, the customary and treaty norms, nonetheless, retain a
separate existence. For the evolution of this concept, see North Sea Continental
Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.CJ. 3 (Feb. 20); Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua. (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14
(June 27). Carlos Tfnnermann Bernheim, United States Armed Intevention in Nica-
ragua and Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 104 (1985);
Herbert W. Briggs, Appraisals of the ICJ's Decison: Nicaragua v. United States (Merits),
81 Am. J. INT'L L. 77, 81 (1987).
15 See Paris Convention, supra note 13, at art. 2.
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portant to note that a specific disposition pertaining to military
aircraft was included within Article 32 of the Paris Convention,
which reads ". . no military aircraft of a contracting State shall
fly over the territory of another contracting State nor land
thereon without special authorization."'
6
Although the Paris Convention did not specifically mention
the concept of "extraterritoriality," it is nonetheless very impor-
tant to note that the Parisian treaty expanded on this norm, and
thus, implicitly granted the norm further international recogni-
tion. In fact, the principle itself of extraterritoriality of military
aircraft was clarified and implemented within Article 32. Article
32 of the Paris Convention edicted that military aircraft, when
authorized to fly over or land in the territory of a foreign coun-
try, now formally benefit from "the privileges, which are custom-
arily accorded to foreign ships of war."' 7 The Paris Convention
thus acknowledged, by reference, that military aircraft that per-
formed sovereign functions benefited from sovereign immunity.
We believe that the Paris Convention crystallized a norm of
international law to the effect that military aircraft are instru-
mentalities of nations performing noncommercial sovereign
functions. This norm then evolved through widespread accept-
ance to become a norm of customary nature. The evolution and
present status of this norm remains unchallenged and is un-
equivocally accepted in the work of eminent legal publicists. 8
The result of Article 32 of the Paris Convention is that military
aircrafts are exempt from the application by other states of legal
enforcement measures applicable to civil aircrafts.' 9 Further-
more, the crew of military aircraft benefit from immunity from
the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign only in so far as to
acts performed during official duties.z° It is also important to
16 Id. at art. 32.
17 Id.
18 As to the pertinence of doctrinal works, Article 38 of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court ofJustice establishes, within paragraph (d), their applicability "subject
to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the de-
termination of rules of law." 1945 I.CJ. Acts & Docs. at art. 38(d).
19 Thus, military aircraft cannot be compelled to pay charges or taxes by at-
tachment or execution of the aircraft. See L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 851
(H. Lauterpacht, ed., 8th ed. 1962); Bin Cheng, THE LAw OF INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORT 75 (1962); Lt. Colonel Chester D. Taylor, Jr., International Flight of
Military Aircraft in Peacetime, 28 FED. BARJ. 36, 43 (1968); BROWNLIE, supra note 8,
at 353; J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 269 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th
ed. 1963).
20 See Taylor, supra note 19, at 49.
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note that foreign officials may not board a state or military air-
craft without the consent of the commander.' Should a dispute
arise regarding customs, immigration, or quarantine, the host
nation is limited to requesting that the state aircraft leave the
national territory.22
The Chicago Convention, 23 as we shall see later in this note,
was very eloquent in its omissions; as it neither explicitly nor
implicitly negated the customary norms affecting the legal status
of military aircraft as initially codified within the Paris Conven-
tion.24 We believe that the Chicago Convention codified other
practices pertaining to State aircraft navigation in international
airspace, such as the rule of "due regard." Nonetheless, unlike
the Paris Convention, the Chicago Convention applies only to
civil aviation and civil aircraft, as evidenced by Article 3. The
effect of the Chicago Convention on military aircraft is minimal.
Consequently, the status of military aircraft was not redefined
with the Chicago Convention and remains, as stated in the Paris
Convention, as a norm of customary international law.
Another issue, that has traditionally burdened international
normative structures regulating aircraft, is the ease in which a
civil aircraft can be converted to military use and vice-versa.25
21 See Office of FleetJudge Advocate, Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval
Operations, para. 2.2.2 (July 1987) [hereinafter Commander's Handbook] availa-
ble at http://www.cpf.navy.mil/pages/legal/NWP%201-14/NWPCH2.htm.
22 See id.
23 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 3(d), 61 Stat.
1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
24 According to Professor Cooper, the chairman of the committee who drafted
and reported Article 3 of the Chicago Convention: "It is felt that the rule stated
in the Paris Convention that aircraft engaged in military services should, in the
absence of stipulation to the contrary, be given the privileges of foreign warships
when in a national port is sound and may be considered as still part of interna-
tional air law even though not restated in the Chicago Convention." JOHN CoB1
COOPER, A Study on the Legal Status of Aircraft, in EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW
242-243 (Ivan A. Vlasic, ed., 1968).
25 An interesting historical fact is mentioned by the ICAO Legal Bureau: In
1920, the Supreme War Council of the Paris Peace Conference asked one of
these committees, the Aeronautical Advisory Commission to the Peace Confer-
ence, which had given its opinion in 1919, to draw up rules to distinguish be-
tween civil aviation and the military and naval aviation forbidden by the Peace
Treaties. The Commission, referring to its 1919 report, replied that the task was
impossible. The Supreme Council insisted that the rules be drawn up; after sev-
eral months of debates, the Commission submitted what is known as "The Nine
Rules" of 1922, for differentiating between military and civil aircraft. The distinc-
tion was based on technical criteria such as engine size, speed, "useful load," etc.
It soon became clear that many civil aircraft fulfilled these criteria and the Rules
were abandoned. ICAO Doc. LC/29-wp/2-1, attachment I, at 7.
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For the planners of military operations, proper classification of
an aircraft is of prime importance since only military aircraft
may exercise belligerent rights.26 This dual use problem
manifests itself again today in space technology, where expertise
initially developed for military purposes is now utilized in civil
commercial applications. These are different epochs using dif-
ferent technology, but similar problems exist in regulating their
use. 7 Nations initially attempted to address this issue within a
proposed treaty regulating military air operations. The pro-
posed 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare outlined two condi-
tions pertaining to the legitimacy of the conversion of an
aircraft from military to civil and vice-versa. First, the conversion
of an aircraft was to be done within the jurisdiction of the bellig-
erent state, which had jurisdiction over the aircraft. Second,
such conversion could not be done in international airspace .2
These two conditions certainly appear reasonable and, we ar-
gue, should still apply.
III. CHICAGO CONVENTION AND MILITARY AIRCRAFT
Contemporary international public air law presently has its
"Magna Carta," which is the Convention on International Civil Avi-
ation.29 The Chicago Convention has received quasi-global rec-
ognition through the accession and ratification of 185 States.
The Chicago Convention is not only a source of normative avia-
tion law, but also is the basic constitutional instrument of inter-
national public administrative law as the "grundnorm" for the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a specialized
agency of the United Nations."
The Chicago Convention does not contain a definition of the
word "aircraft." Nonetheless, a definition exists within the Chi-
cago system, namely within the Annexes to the Chicago Conven-
tion. For example in Annexes 6, 7, and 10, the definition reads
as follows: "Aircraft: Any machine that can derive support in the
26 See Draft Rules of Aerial Warfare, art. 13, 1923 proposed Hague Rules (Feb.
1923) (hereinafter Hague Draft Rules).
27 Dual use can also have an impact of the insurance of airplanes. This, how-
ever, is an issue of private international law and is beyond the scope of this
article.
26 See Hague Draft Rules, supra note 26, at art. 9.
29 Chicago Convention, supra note 23.
30 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 57 and 63.
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atmosphere from the reactions of the air other than the reac-
tions of the air against the earth's surface."'"
The words "other than the reactions of the air against the
earth's surface" were added in 1967 to exclude hovercraft from
being legally considered as an aircraft.
The apparent transparency of Article 3 of the Chicago Con-
vention is deceiving. A primafacie reading of this article can lead
one to conclude that it simply edicts the scope of applicability of
the Convention, which is limited to civil aircrafts. This conclu-
sion is somewhat facile. Granted, Article 3 does limit the scope
of applicability of the treaty to civil aircrafts, and the remaining
articles of the Treaty must be interpreted in this light. Nonethe-
less, a more rigorous analysis of Article 3 reveals its richness and
subtleties. Article 3 is of prime importance to international air
transport, both civil and military. It reads as follows:
Article 3
(a) This Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft, and
shall not be applicable to state aircraft.
(b) Aircraft used in military, customs and police services shall be
deemed to be state aircraft.
(c) No state aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the terri-
tory of another State or land thereon without authorization by a
special agreement or otherwise, and in accordance with the
terms thereof.
(d) The contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations
for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for the
safety of navigation of civil aircraft."
Five fundamental principles can be deduced from Article 33'
First, application of the Chicago Convention excludes military,
custom, and police aircraft, which are deemed to be state air-
craft. Second, the law-making powers of the ICAO Council to
adopt Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) 34 and
the overall mandate of the Organization apply exclusively to
civil/commercial aircraft as defined within the Chicago system.
Third, military, police and custom aircraft are state aircraft, ex-
cluded from the Chicago system and thus, are not permitted to
31 Chicago Convention, supra note 23, at Annexes 6, 7, and 10.
32 Id. at art. 3.
33 Michael Milde argues that four principles are to be derived from this article.
See Michael Milde, Status of Military Aircraft in International Law, INT'L CONF.
PROC., Singapore Ministry of Defense 21-31 (1999).
34 See Chicago Convention, supra note 23, at arts. 37, 38, 54(1) and 90.
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fly over or land within the territory of a foreign State without
prior express authorization of the State concerned. 5 Fourth, in
principle, state aircraft (military custom or police) are re-
stricted to flying within the territory of their own State,36 over
the high seas,17 and the areas of undetermined sovereignty.",
And finally, States which are a Party to the Convention have an
obligation to regulate their state aircraft by promulgating within
their national regulatory structure a duty of "due regard" upon
operators of state aircraft, and thus, upon military aircraft, for
the safety of the navigation of civil aircraft. 9 Parenthetically
speaking, a principle cannot exist without its exceptions. Con-
versely, exceptions confirm the principle. This reality of norms
15 This principle is subject to a few exceptions, which are analyzed in this pa-
per, such as right of transit passage, archipelagic sea-lanes passage, entry in cases
of distress, and force majeure. Overflight exceptions for unmanned observation
aircraft were also created in the Open Skies Treaty (agreed by the North Atlantic
Council Meeting in Ministerial Session at NATO Headquarters in Brussels on
December 14' and 15 ' of 1989), but an analysis of this is beyond the scope of
this article. In the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas (signed in Moscow on May
25, 1972), the term "aircraft" is defined as "all military manned heavier-than-air
and lighter-than-air craft, excluding space craft. Art. I, § 2. This Treaty also im-
poses certain restriction and rules of caution and prudence on the flight of mili-
tary aircraft over the high seas, such as simulated attacks by the simulated use of
weapons, the performance of various aerobatics over ships, or dropping various
objects near them in a hazardous manner. See Art. V. Further, navigational
lights must be used. Art. V.
315 A definition of which can be found in Article 2 of the Chicago Convention,
which codifies international customary law as "'territory"' comprises the land
mass and the territorial waters." Chicago Convention, supra note 23, at art. 2.
37 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec.
10, 1982, art. 87, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
38 Other treaty norms affect military flights over Antarctica. The Antarctic
Treaty of 1959 edicts certain norms applicable to military flights over the frozen
continent. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. "Antarctica shall be
used for peaceful purposes only" and "any measures of a military nature, such as
the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military
maneuvers, as well as, the testing of any type of weapons [shall be prohibited]."
Id. at art. 1.1. Furthermore, all aircraft, at points of discharging or embarking
cargo or personnel in Antarctica, are subject to inspection by designated observ-
ers. Id. at art. VII.3. Due to these restrictions, classified activities are not con-
ducted by the U.S. in Antarctica. All classified materials are removed from U.S.
aircraft before going to Antarctica. See Commander's Handbook, supra note 21,
at para. 2.4.5.2.1.
39 The Chicago Convention "... does not apply to military aircraft or MAC-
charter aircraft designated as 'state aircraft' other than to require that they oper-
ate with due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft." Chicago Conven-
tion, supra note 23, at para. 2.5.2.1.
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is also true of international public air law. Throughout this
note, exceptions to the above-cited principles of Article 3 will be
exposed and analyzed.4"
This note will now analyze two principles of Article 3. These
are the concept and function of military aircraft and the obliga-
tion of "due regard."
A. ARTICLE 3(B)
Article 3 of the Chicago Convention refers to the concept
state aircraft."41 Unfortunately, Article 3 does not establish a
definition of either the concept of state aircraft or civil aircraft.
Article 3(b) of the Convention edicts that "aircraft used in mili-
tary, customs and police services shall be deemed to be state air-
craft."42 This is not a definition, but only a presumption since
the word "deemed" is used. .In interpreting Article 3(b), both
the nature of the enumeration and the nature of the presump-
tion must be correctly ascertained.
Using a broad interpretation of Article 3(b), the enumeration
would not be limitative but would serve as an example of what
could be considered to be a state aircraft. One would then have
to determine a common attribute of these examples in order to
40 For example, a controversey exists in the interpretation of the U.N. Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea pertaining to the legitimacy of aerial military maneu-
vers over the exclusive economic zones, which could be an exception to the
freedom of overflight edicted within Article 3 of the Chicago Convention.
41 In Canada, the Air Regulations pursuant to the Aeronautics Act define the
concept of "State Aircraft" as follows: "state aircraft means a civil aircraft owned
by and exclusively used in the service of Her Majesty in right of Canada or in
right of any province." Aeronautics Act Air Regulations § 101(1), available at
http://www.tc.gc.ca/actsregs/aeronaut/old-airregs/aa2.htm. In turn, the con-
cept "civil aircraft" is defined within these regulations as follows: "civil aircraft
means any aircraft other than a military aircraft." Id. The result leads to an inter-
pretative quagmire that must be corrected. For example, according to the Cana-
dian definition, an aircraft used in custom or police services is both a civil aircraft
and a state aircraft, while the same aircraft is classified within the Chicago system
as being exclusively a state aircraft. Furthermore, according to the Canadian def-
inition, a military aircraft is not a state aircraft! The Chicago classification system
clearly establishes military aircraft as state aircraft. Canadian definitions should
be amended to respect the Chicago classification system. Under Australian do-
mestic legislation (the Air Navigation Act 1920 and the Civil Aviation Act 1988), the
term 'state aircraft' is defined to mean "aircraft of any part of the Defense force
(including any aircraft that is commanded by a member of that force in the
course of duties as such a member), other than any aircraft that, by virtue of
registration under the regulations, is an Australian aircraft; and aircraft used in
the military, customs or police service of a foreign country."
42 See Chicago Convention, supra note 23, at art. 3(b).
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justify its application to other fields. It could then be logical to
conclude that these examples refer not only to acts lure imperii43
of states but also include acts lure gestionis of States. Thus, many
other types of aircraft may be involved in activities of the State,
for example, medical services, mapping or geological survey ser-
vices, disaster relief, VIP Government transport and mail ser-
vices, or even privately owned aircraft transporting military
personnel. The consequence of this approach is an expansion
of the exception reducing the scope of applicability of the Chi-
cago regulatory system.
Using a restrictive interpretation of Article 3(b), the enumera-
tion becomes limitative or exhaustive.44 In other words, the only
Chicago-type "state" aircraft excluded from the applicability of
the convention are those used in "military, customs, and police
services."45 The result of a restrictive interpretation is to reduce
the exception and expand the scope of applicability of the Chi-
cago regulatory system.
This interpretative dilemma of Article 3(b) results from the
fact that the article in question does not explicitly determine the
nature of this enumeration. Although both interpretations are
logical from an exegetical perspective, we, however, proffer that
the restrictive approach is a more reasonable and correct
method of interpretation. Our position is based on the follow-
ing three arguments.
First, the enumeration must be construed within the context
of the treaty. Context can be determined in reference to the
preambular clause.46 The preamble expresses concern for de-
velopment of international civil aviation to avoid friction and to
promote cooperation and safety. The different criteria establish
a setting or a contextual reference, coloring the subsequent
norms. These norms can, in turn, be understood in their ability
to affect the activity regulated. The limit to a contextual ap-
proach is, however, determined by the reasonableness of the
conclusion reached.4 7 Within its context, a restrictive interpre-
43 For an interesting analysis of the lure imperii and lure gestionis acts of states,
see BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 330-32.
44 See NlcoLAs MATEESCO MATTE, TRArrt DE DROIT AERIEN-AERONAUTIQUE (2d
ed. 1964); see also Cheng, supra note 19 at 112. Bin Cheng, State Ships and State
Aircraft, in CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 225 (George W. Keeton and Georg
Schwarzenberger eds. 1958).
45 See Chicago Convention, supra note 23, at art. 3(b).
46 See Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v.
U.S.), 1952 I.CJ. 176 (Aug. 27).
47 See Polish Postal Service in Danzig, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 11, at 39.
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tation of the exception appears as the most cogent interpreta-
tion yielding a reasonable application of the norms with an
ordinary meaning of the terms used. Although the norms can
be expanded or limited through interpretation, treaties must
not be revised through interpretation.48 We believe that to con-
strue the exception in an expansive manner would be altering
the treaty itself from both grammatical and contextual
perspectives.
Second, as the ICAO Legal Committee pointed out in its Re-
port of the Secretariat on the issue when proffering an argu-
mentation similar to ours, that in commenting Article 3(b), the
Chairman of the drafting committee49 wrote in a study pub-
lished in 1949:
". ..[The]... Convention is purposely less definite than some of
its predecessors. The language used was understood to be vague
but was considered a more practical solution than any other of
the several attempts, which had been made in the past to define
such classes as, for example, military aircraft. The determining
factor ... is whether a particular aircraft is, at a particular time,
actually used in one of the three special types of services. If so, it
is a "state aircraft." Otherwise, it is a "civil aircraft 5 0
A polemic surrounds the use of Professor Cooper's writings
on this specific issue. The representative of Canada at ICAO
expressed doubts on the "persuasive value in the recollections of
the Chairman of the drafting committee for Article 3," arguing
that in later studies his opinion might have "substantially
evolved." We, however, remain unconvinced by the Canadian
position.' This polemic brings up an interesting debate over
the use of supplementary means of interpretation. In the Case
Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between
Quatar and Bahrain,5 2 the ICJ viewed supplementary means of
interpretation as an optional tool and not as a necessary tool for
interpretative confirmation. As a supplementary tool, it has less
probative value than either a textual analysis or reference to the
logical construct of the treaty. Within this case, the ICJ was
asked to use supplementary means of interpretation to decipher
a phrase. In the words of the ICJ:
48 See Peace Treaties, 1950 I.CJ. 229.
49 ICAO Doc. LC/29-wp/2-1, attachment I, at 13.
50 See id.
51 Id. at. 22.
52 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), 1995 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 15).
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The Court does not consider it necessary to resort to supplemen-
tary means of interpretation in order to determine the meaning
of the Doha Minutes ... however, as in other cases53 , it considers
that it can have recourse to such supplementary means in order
to seek a possible confirmation of its interpretation of the text.
5
The methodology of interpretation used by the ICJ was first to
analyze the meaning and scope of the disputed phrase. This
analysis was done through a semantic deconstruction using the
"most natural sense ' 55 and "ordinary meaning"56 of the words.
On a second level, the ICJ verified its interpretation by looking
at the "logical implications of the expression ' '5 v interpreted.
The Court then rejected possible interpretations that would "en-
counter serious difficulties, 5 8 or would "deprive the phrase of
its effect and could well, moreover lead to an unreasonable re-
sult."'59 Once the ICJ was satisfied with the result of this method-
ology, supplementary methods could be used, but these
remained purely optional. Consequently, the probative value of
supplementary means is lessened once the primary methodol-
ogy yields a cogent conclusion. In this light, the polemic sur-
rounding the use of Professor Cooper's writings to negate a
strong textual argument is reduced in effect.
Finally, a restrictive interpretation of the exception, the effect
of which expands the scope of applicability of the convention, is
consistent not only with the telos of the treaty, but also with both
the object and purpose of the Convention.6" A teleological anal-
ysis is particularly relevant because the Chicago Convention is
53 See, e.g., Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad) 1994 I.CJ. 6, 27, para. 55 (Feb. 3).
54 Qatar v. Bahr., 1995 I.CJ. at para. 40.




59 Id. at para 55.
60 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, R21.4(c) 8
I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). See also the Golder Case, 57 I.L.R.
200 (1975); Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.CJ. 6 (Feb. 3). The I.CJ.
confirmed that Article 31 represents customary international law of treaty inter-
pretation. Thus, if a State is a member of ICAO, but is not a party to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, it would, nonetheless, find this interpretation
binding. The word "context" of Article 31 also includes the preamble. See The
Golder Case, 57 I.L.R. at 200; Beagle Channel Arbitration (Chile v. Arg.) 17
I.L.M. 634 (1978).
2001] 899
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
not an end in itself, but rather a means to an end.61 The Chi-
cago Convention is fundamentally purposive, establishing a
goal-directed international administrative structure. The end
result being the safety of aviation as a whole and civil aviation in
particular. Within a teleological perspective, the important in-
terpretative questions are first, does this goal-directed activity re-
quire us to employ special concepts or define patterns found
within the Chicago system to help us interpret the system cohe-
sively? And second, should we look at the inherent nature of
the Chicago system in terms that exhibit a functional activity?
Finally, in describing the function of the Chicago system, should
we refer to special concepts or patterns of analysis? We answer
these three questions in the affirmative.
The goals of the Chicago system are not only stated in the
preamble, but also form part of the objectives of ICAO as stated
in Article 44 of the Chicago Convention. Thus, a restrictive in-
terpretation of the above-cited disposition, expanding the appli-
cability of the Chicago Convention, ensures for greater safety in
air transportation. Furthermore, and most importantly, in the
specific case of international organizations, the favored interpre-
tation of the constituent document must be that which allows
the organization to effectively achieve its objectives.6 2
The nature of the presumption must also be determined. In
other words, does Article 3(b) create an irrefutable Juris et de
lure presumption or is it a refutable Juris Tantum presumption?
Airplanes have the inherent capacity for dual use. Civil air-
planes can certainly be used for military missions and vice versa.
One can prima facie conclude that this fact necessarily leads to
the conclusion that the presumption must be a refutable Iuris
Tantum presumption. This argument, despite its appeal, may be
facile and, we believe, wrong for two reasons.
First, it is important to note that the drafters of the Conven-
tion used the word "shall," which implies that what follows is
mandatory, implying a command, an obligation, or an instruc-
tion. At the very least, the word "shall" refers to a strong asser-
6 This is a dynamic method of treaty interpretation, specifically of its use by
the ICJ. See Rights of Nationals of the United States in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.),
1952 I.CJ. 176, 197-198 (Aug. 27).
62 See Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.CJ. 151 (July 20). Doctri-
nal analysis supports our position. See MATTE, supra note 44, at 132; Cheng, supra
note 19, at 112 (where Professor Cheng writes that the Chicago Convention "em-
braces all matters relating to aviation not exclusively connected with 'aircraft
used in military, customs and police services.'").
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tion or intention. Conversely, the drafters of the Chicago
Convention did not use the words "may be deemed," which
would then necessarily lead to a refutable Juris Tantum presump-
tion. It is also interesting to note the semantic difference within
Article XXX of the Treaty of Paris, which used the idiom "such
as" before enumerating the "posts, customs, and police" services.
Second, the word "deemed" can be constructed to mean "con-
sidered," or within the context of this Article, "considered for
the purpose of the Chicago Convention." This last point is very
important and respects the interpretative subtleties required to
grasp the full effect of the Chicago Convention.
For the irrefutable Juris et de lure theory to be accepted, an-
other interpretative obstacle needs to be crossed. How can this
presumption be reconciled with the dual use of aircraft argu-
ment initially presented in the Juris Tantum theory? Indeed, one
simply cannot negate the fact that civil airplanes can be used for
military missions and vice versa. It is, however, important to
note that the presumption applies to the nature of the flight
and not to the aircraft itself.
The answer to this apparent paradox becomes clearer. Air-
planes that are used in the execution of functions of "military
customs and police services" are "Chicago-type" State aircraft.
Thus, other government aircraft, which execute other iuri im-
perii, function as diplomatic transport or mail, remain state air-
craft as "qua" state aircraft, but not as "Chicago-type" state
aircraft and fall within the scope of applicability of the Chicago
Convention.63 However, according to state practice, aircraft that
transport government officials will often benefit from a diplo-
63 According to the ICAO Legal Bureau, this is the predominant view. Com-
paring the Chicago system with the Parisian system, the legal bureau opined that
the International Commission on Air Navigation (ICAN) created by the Paris
Convention had the power to amend the Annexes to that Convention, which,
when so amended, would bind all contracting States; there was no opportunity to
file a difference, and ICAN in effect had legislative powers. The same is not true
of the Chicago system and States would be less hesitant to subject their other
"state" aircraft to the Chicago regime. Futhermore, even under the Paris Con-
vention, all state aircraft other than military, custom and police aircraft were
treated as private aircraft and subjected to all the provisions of the Paris Conven-
tion. Although the Chicago Convention does not explicitly say that all other air-
craft shall be treated as civil aircraft and become subject to all the provisions of
the convention, there is nevertheless nothing to indicate that the drafters of the
Chicago Convention had any intention to depart from the substance of this provi-
sion; it is felt that any such intention would have been spelt out unambiguously.
ICAO Doc. LC/29-wp/2-1, attachment 1, at 13 (Mar. 3, 1994).
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matic agreement establishing the non-applicability of the Chi-
cago Convention to its flight.
The result of this interpretation is that the qualification of the
nature of the state aircraft within the Chicago system is irrele-
vant to the determination of other issues, such as sovereign im-
munity64 and other rights and privileges attached to state
aircraft "qua" state aircraft. In the reverse situation, a state air-
craft, as defined within the Chicago lexicon, is, however, neces-
sarily a state aircraft "qua" state aircraft. Also, state aircraft that
are not "Chicago-type" state aircraft are subject to the Chicago
regulatory structure and are subject to the norms established
within this treaty.
Taken in this light, an aircraft that performs a military, cus-
toms, or police service is irrefutably excluded from the Chicago
regulatory structure, while its possible mutation to civil func-
tions is respected.
In the context of this note, the definition of "military" aircraft
is important." However, the Chicago Convention does not give
any definition of the term "military services."
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties edicts in Arti-
cles 31 and 4 that "a special meaning shall be given to a term if it
is established that the parties so intended." However, we have
not been able to discern any special intention of the parties with
respect to this terminology. We believe that the word "military"
must be interpreted by its ordinary meaning, referring to the
armed forces of a state executing acts iuri imperii.
What characteristics distinguish an aircraft as being "mili-
tary?" The answer may only be found in a contextual analysis of
the flight in question."h
64 It is interesting to note that the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea also
edicts rules of sovereign immunuty of state aircraft. See United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, supra note 37, at arts. 29-32, 95-96, 236.
65 "The earliest efforts to characterize aircraft as military were based upon the
character of the commander of the craft. If he was a uniformed member of the
military services and had on board a certificate of the military character, the air-
craft would be considered military. In the wake of World War I, some efforts
were made to distinguish between civil and military aircraft on the basis of de-
sign. Later commentators pointed out the impossibility in distinguishing aircraft
on the basis of design, and therefore use was the principal basis upon which
aircraft were distinguished." Air Force Pamphlets, International Law - The Conduct
of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, AFP 110-31, para. 2-4.c (Nov. 19, 1976) (here-
inafter AFP 110-31); see also Colonal Frank Fedele, Overflight by Military Aircraft in
Time of Peace, 9 AFJAG L. REv. 8, 23 (1967).
6 A military aircraft is defined as follows: "an aircraft operated by commis-
sioned units of the armed forces of a State having the military marks of that State,
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The United States Navy defines "military aircraft" in one of its
manuals as: "all aircraft operated by commissioned units of the
armed forces of a nation bearing the military markings of that
nation, commanded by a member of the armed forces, and
manned by a crew subject to regular armed forces discipline."67
According to USAF manuals, the Chicago system definition of
"aircraft" includes both heavier and lighter than air objects, but
excludes objects that are more properly perceived as being pro-
jectiles, such as rockets.68 The presence of a crew is not impor-
tant; thus allowing pilotless aircraft to fall within the Chicago
definition.
We proffer that the following elements could reasonably be
considered either individually or in combination in determining
the military nature of the flight of an aircraft. The following
characteristics however, are neither exhaustive nor
determinative.
Registration marks: The nationality and registration of an air-
craft may designate the aircraft as military, but that fact by itself
is not conclusive proof that the aircraft is used as military in a
given situation. Ownership (state or private): The fact that the
aircraft is owned by a state or a defense ministry is relevant.
Type of operation: The nature of the flight, flight plan, commu-
nications procedures, secrecy classification, and cargo carried,
such as military equipment, including weapons are relevant. Ar-
ticle 35 of the Chicago Convention, however, edicts that the car-
commanded by a member of the armed forces and manned by a crew subject to
regular armed forces discipline." See INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HUMANITARIAN
LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CON-
FLICTS AT SEA, para 13(j) (Louis Doswald-Beck ed. 1995) [hereinafter San Remo
Manual]. This manual defines civil aircraft as "an aircraft other than a military,
auxiliary, or State aircraft such as a custom or police aircraft that is engaged in
commercial or private service." See id. at para. 13(1). The Treaty on Conven-
tional Armed Forces in Europe, 30 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1 (1991), defines the
term "combat aircraft" as being a "fixed-wing or variable-geometry wing aircraft
armed and equipped to engage targets by employing guided missiles, unguided
rockets, bombs, guns, cannons, or other weapons of destruction, as well as, any
model or version of such aircraft which performs other military functions, such as
reconnaissance or electronic warfare." Art. 1(K).
67 Commander's Handbook, supra note 21, at para. 2.2.1. Commissioned units
of U.S. military aircraft are called squadrons and are established pursuant to the
authority of the chief of service concerned. All aircraft, like warships, assume the
nationality of the nation in which they are registered and are marked with sym-
bols or designations of their nationality. The markings of military aircraft should
differ from those of other state aircraft and from those of civil aircraft. See AFP
110-31, supra note 65, at para. 2-4(b), 2-4, 2-5, n. 14.
68 See AFP 110-31, supra note 65, at para. 2-4.
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riage of "munitions or implements of war" is not in itself
conclusive of a state aircraft. Flight subject to military discipline
and military law or civilian or military crew: Whether the opera-
tor of the aircraft is a defense ministry, military, custom, or po-
lice agency is relevant. Area of operation: This refers to whether
the aircraft is flying in a theatre of military operation in an inter-
national armed conflict. Is the mission one of self defense, mili-
tary training, a NATO or NORAD related flight, an execution of
U.N. Charter Article 51 (self defense or collective self defense,
or even a customary right of self defense) or on a U.N. mission
for either peacekeeping (Chapter VI) or peace enforcement
(Chapter VII), or a humanitarian mission such as the evacuation
of civilians from a conflict area? Missions that result from mili-
tary treaties are the execution of international obligations of
states.
The key to interpreting Article 3(b) of the Chicago Conven-
tion may be found in the expressions "used' and "services." The
word "used' is a verb. Taken in a military context, this word can
mean, "deployed," usually to accomplish a mission or exercise.
The word "services" is the plural of the word "service," which can
mean the use for a particular purpose. This is clearly a func-
tional approach to the issue. Thus, it is conceivable that a given
aircraft may be classified alternatively as either civil or state. If a
military aircraft is to be used to conduct a "civil flight," then the
"6military" aircraft, which would be subject to the rights created
in the Chicago Convention, should respect the ICAO navigation
and security standards. Thus, states should not allow military
airplanes that do not respect ICAO standards to make civil
flights. This, we argue, is not only a question of state responsi-
bility, but also an implicit obligation resulting from a coherent
interpretation respecting the integrity of the Chicago
Convention.
A converse example, namely of a civil aircraft operating a
"nilitary" flight would be the following: states sometimes use
their national air carrier in case of supplementary needs for mil-
itary air transport capacity in times of crisis. For example, an Air
Canada plane with Air Canada pilots and crew could be carrying
military personnel and equipment for military purposes. Within
such a scenario, two important issues arise. First, the qualifica-
tion of the flight as either "civil" or "military," and second, the
determination of the legal status of the crew wearing the civilian
uniform of the airline while their commercial aircraft is
chartered by the department of National Defense for military
904
MILITARY AIRCRAFT
use abroad. Within this scenario, the chartered plane carries
only civilian markings, but it would be transporting military per-
sonnel in uniform, along with their weapons, between two mili-
tary bases in different allied countries. Canada's policy in such
situations is to issue special identification cards to the civilian
crew in order to offer the protection of the Geneva Conventions
in case of capture during hostilities. For example, in Bosnia,
such a flight would have a military call sign. Without these pre-
cautions, the opposing belligerent forces could treat the civilian
personnel as spies if captured. 9
An aircraft that is registered as a civil aircraft but that is subse-
quently leased by a national defense force or police or customs
services and used in the execution of mandates particular to
these services qualifies as a state aircraft and can be so desig-
nated by its national authorities."' The qualification of such a
flight, however, remains within the discretionary latitude of na-
tional policy. If the flight retains its civil qualification, then
ICAO rules must be respected. ICAO recommends that when
an operator accepts the carriage of weapons, these weapons
must be removed from passengers and stored in a manner in
which they are not accessible to any person during flight time.7"
ICAO also recommends that should an aircraft carry bombs,
then "specialized means of attenuating and directing, the blast
should be provided for use at the least-risk bomb location."72
Considering that countries with small military budgets some-
times do need extra air transport capacity from commercial car-
riers for operations abroad, we believe that the legal
6" See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 13, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; see also Geneva Convention for
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members
of Armed Forces at Sea, Oct. 21, 1950, art. 13, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Ge-
neva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, Oct. 21, 1950, art 4(4), 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Ge-
neva Convention III]. The present Convention shall apply to the wounded and
sick belonging to the following categories:
... (4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually
being members thereof, such as civil members of military aircraft
crews ... provided that they have received authorization from the
armed forces which they accompany.
70 As a policy decision, the United States normally does not designate military
contract chartered aircraft as state aircraft. See Commander's Handbook, supra
note 21, at para. 2.2.3.
71 See Chicago Convention, supra note 23, at Annex 6, § 13.5.2.
72 Id. 13.5.1.
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consequences of such action should be the subject of a special
study by the legal committee of ICAO. For example, Canada
used Ukrainian carriers to deploy forces to Kosovo.
The only document that dealt exclusively with air warfare was
the 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare.7 3 This document also
contained an article that also established a presumption, and
not a definition, of a public aircraft:
Article 2
The following shall be deemed to be public aircraft:
Military aircraft;
Non-military aircraft exclusively employed in the public
service.
All other aircraft shall be deemed to be private aircraft.
Public, non-military aircraft employed for customs or police
purposes were to carry papers evidencing this use and bear ex-
ternal marks indicating both its nationality and non-military
character."4 Public, non-military aircrafts, other than those
employed for customs and police were, for the purpose of ae-
rial warfare, to be treated on the same footing as private air-
craft.75 Thus, the proposed Hague rules had a commonality
with the Chicago classification system.
An interesting dimension of the problem in establishing a le-
gal definition of "state aircraft" can be found in maritime law.
The technique of importing maritime law concepts into air law
is not new, however, for the Paris Convention had established a
parallel in reference to warships in dealing with the status of
military aircraft. The legal definition of a "warship"76 is seen in
the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), 77 Article 29
that reads:
For the purpose of this Convention, "warship" means a ship be-
longing to the armed forces of a state bearing the external marks
distinguishing such ship of nationality, under the command of
an officer duly commissioned by the government of the State and
whose name appears in the appropriate service list of its
73 See RICHARD GUELFF & ADAM RoBERTS, DOCUMENTS ON TlE LAWS OF WAR 139
(3d ed. 2000).
74 Hague Draft Rules, supra note 26, at art 4.
75 Id. at art. 5.
76 Michael Milde argues for a parallel between the definition of a warship and
a possible definition of a military aircraft. See Milde, supra note 33.
77 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 37.
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equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular armed
forces discipline. ' 8
Under this definition, a warship does not have to be armed,
and in relation, neither should a military aircraft. An aircraft
carrier is certainly a "warship" as defined within the Law of the
Sea Treaty. There is agreement in doctrinal analysis that an air-
craft carrier, as a warship, benefits from extraterritoriality.7 9 Air-
craft are a necessary and indispensable part of aircraft carriers
and are specifically designed to function on these ships. Being a
necessary accessory to the principle, they must logically benefit
from the same rights, accessorium sequitur principale. It would also
be unreasonable to grant certain rights to certain airplanes de-
pending upon the origin of their flight-that is, either land or
sea. Our interpretation yields a coherent normative application
to airplanes irrespective of the origin of their sorties.
Within its report of the Secretariat, the legal bureau of ICAO
describes two incidents of aircraft interception where the qualifi-
cation of the flight became an important issue."s The first and
most important incident occurred on October 10, 1985, during
the Achille Lauro incident.8 " Egypt Air Flight MS 2843 was inter-
cepted by U.S. Navy jets while in international air space, roughly
eighty miles south of Crete. The airplane was en route from
Cairo to Tunis and was forced to land in Sicily. The terrorists
involved in the hijacking of the luxury cruise ship Achille Lauro
were on board the airplane. According to the Legal Bureau re-
port, the pilot considered his flight to be of a civil nature. The
United States was, however, of a different opinion. The United
States Government, in a letter to IFALPA dated 13 November
1985, stated
78 According to the U.S. Department of State report to the Senate, this defini-
tion expands upon earlier definitions, no longer requiring that such a ship belong to the
"naval" forces of a nation, under the command of an officer whose name appears in the
"Navy list" and manned by a crew who are under regular "naval" discipline. Article. 29
instead refers to "armed forces" to accomodate the integration of different branches of the
armed forces in various countries, the operation of seagoing craft by some armies and air
forces, and the existence of a coast guard as a separate unit of the armed forces of some
nations, such as the United States. See Press Statement, U.S. Department of State Law of
the Sea, 1994 Law of the Sea (Oct. 6, 1994) [hereinafter LOS Pres Statement],
available at http: //dosfan.lib.uic.edu/RC/lazv/press-statements/9410.html.
79 See BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 366, BRIERLY, supra note 19, at 267-69; Oppen-
heim, supra note 19, at 461, 851-59; Cheng, supra note 19, at 11.
8l See ICAO Doc. LC/29-wp/2-1.
81 See George M. Borkowski, Use of Force: Interception of Aircraft - Interception of
Egyptian Airliner by the United States, Oct. 10, 1985; Interception of Libyan Airplane by
Israel, Feb. 3, 1986, 27 HARV. INT'L LJ. 761 (1986).
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[I] t is our view that the aircraft was operating as a state aircraft at
the time of the interception. The relevant factors - including
exclusive State purpose and function of the mission, the pres-
ence of armed military personnel on board, and the secrecy
under which the mission was attempted - compel this
conclusion.8 2
It is also interesting to note that during the Egypt Air inter-
ception, the airplane was originally bound for Tunis. Tunisia
had refused it permission to land, and the Greek authorities also
subsequently denied the airplane landing rights in Athens."
These refusals for landing rights presuppose a reclassification of
the flight as a state aircraft. The United States, therefore, was
not the only country to accept the reclassification of the Egypt
Air flight as a state aircraft.
The second incident cited in the report occurred on February
4, 1986 and is somewhat more controversial than the first. A
Libyan Arab Airline departed from Tripoli on a non-scheduled
flight to Damascus. While in international airspace, the airplane
was intercepted by the Israeli air force. The Israelis were search-
ing for Palestinian leaders, 4 but only found "seven Syrian politi-
cians and two low-ranking Lebanese militia officials on board."
Doubts were expressed as to the nature of the flight. However,
this interception was based on faulty intelligence.8 5 The ICAO
council adopted a resolution on February 28, 1986, stating that
it considered that Israel had "committed an act against interna-
tional civil aviation in violation of the principles of the Chicago
Convention"8 " and condemned Israel for the interception. The
commonality of these two examples lies in the reclassification of
a civil flight. The first example involving the Egypt Air aircraft
was an important and courageous act in the fight against inter-
national terrorism. The Egypt Air interception, like the Lock-
erbie Case shows,8 7 that terrorists will not be allowed to hide
82 ICAO Doc. LC/29-wp/2-1, attachment 1, at 12.
W- See Borkowski, supra note 81, at 762.
84 See id. at 761.
85 In reference to the Egypt Air interception, the U.S. state department em-
phasized that states should intercept civilian aircraft only on the basis of the
strongest evidence that terrorists are on board. See Borkowski, supra note 81, at
762-63.
84 ICAO Doc. LC/29-wp/2-1, attachment 1, at 12.
87 This was the downing of Pan American Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland,
on December 21, 1988. This case was concerned with state-sponsored terrorism,
the role of the U.N. Security Council, and the Montreal Convention of Septem-
ber 23, 1971. The Security Council expressed that it was deeply disturbed by acts
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behind dispositions of international air law. The interchangea-
bility of classification of a flight within the Chicago system per-
mits States to have a scope of freedom of action. Thus, in the
fight against international terrorism, the Chicago system re-
mains vibrant and credible. The Israeli interception, however,
remains as a caveat for States-as a dubious example of reclassifi-
cation and its potential for erroneous action.
Another dubious example of aircraft interception and the
possible capture of terrorists occurred on August 10, 1973, when
the Israeli airforce diverted and seized a Lebanese civil aircraft
that had been chartered by Iraqi Airways. According to the
Chief Delegate of Lebanon at ICAO at the time, the intercep-
tion occurred in the following manner.
At 21:00 hours, a Caravelle aircraft, belonging to the Leba-
nese carrier, Middle East Airlines, chartered by Iraqi Airways, for
a flight from Beirut to Baghdad, requested clearance for take-
off. The Air Traffic Controller warned the pilot of the existing
danger and take-off was delayed. Ten minutes later, he received
clearance for take-off and headed northwest. Two minutes after
take-off, two Mirage fighter planes headed for the runway and
overflew it. Four minutes after take-off of the Caravelle, the pi-
of international terrorism endangering innocent lives and having a deleterious
effect on international relations and jeopardizing the security of states. See S.C.
Res. 731, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3033d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/731 (1992).
The Security Council stated it was acting under Chapter VII and decided to cre-
ate an air embargo in which all states would "deny permission to an aircraft to take off
from, land in, or overfly their territory if it is destined to land in or has taken off from the
territory of Libya, unless the particilar flight has been approved on grounds of significant
humanitarian need by the Security Council Committee established by paragraph nine be-
low." See also S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/748 (1992). This case was referred to the I.C.J. See Questions of Interpreta-
tion and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 9 (Feb. 27). This case generated
a flurry of interesting legal articles. For an analysis of this case from a Libyan
perspective, see SAFIA AOUDE, The Lockerbie Legality: What Went Wrong in Interna-
tional Criminal Law?, available at http://www.mathaba.net/info/locker-leg.htm;
see also W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 Am. J.
INT'L L. 83 (1993). David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the
Security Council, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 552 (1993); Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Rela-
tionship Between the International Court ofJustice and the Security Council in the Light of
the Lockerbie Case, 88 Am.J. INT'L L. 643 (1994);Jose E. Alvarez, Judging the Security
Council, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1996); Bernd Martenczuk, The Security Council, the
International Court of Justice and Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie?, 10
E.J.I.L. 517 (1999); Thomas M. Franck, The "Powers of Appreciation": Who is the
Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?, 86 AM.J. IN'L L. 519 (1992); Lee S. Kreindler,
Litigation Status in Lockerbie Case, 219 N.Y. LJ. 82.
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lot signaled the control tower that two Israeli Mirage planes, or-
dering him to change course if he wished to save the lives of his
passengers, flanked his aircraft. Forty-five miles from Beirut In-
ternational Airport, the Caravelle turned southwards, still es-
corted by the Mirage planes, entered Israeli airspace, and was
forced to land.8
Attempting tojustify the interception, at the ICAO, the Chief
Delegate of Israel argued that Israel believed that a dangerous
criminal named George Habash of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine was aboard the intercepted aircraft. The
individual in question had supposedly played an important role
in several hijackings and murders of passengers flying interna-
tional routes. 8 ' According to the Chief Delegate of Israel, his
country's actions were motivated partly by the desire to protect
international civil aviation from terrorist actions. '.. The Israeli
government qualified the interception as an exceptional mea-
sure aimed at saving human lives from terrorists, who were en-
dangering international civil aviation.' The Delegate of the
United States expressed the view that the "resolutions unani-
mously adopted by the Security Council and the Council of
ICAO were appropriate to the action of the Israeli Air Force."
On August 15, the United Nations Security Council expressed
grave concern over this matter, qualifying the act as "a serious
interference with international civil aviation and a violation of
the Charter of the United Nations.' 9 2 In condemning the gov-
ernment of Israel for this interception, the Security Council
stated that such acts are not only violations of conventional air
law, but also of a cease-fire resolution adopted by the UNSC in
1967 and of "principles of international law and morality.''
3':
The UNSC called upon ICAO to take due account of its resolu-
tion when considering measures to protect international civil
aviation against such actions. 4 The ICAO assembly responded
by strongly condemning Israel for this forcible diversion of a
88 Report and Minutes of the Executive Committee, Minutes of the Fifth Plenary Meeting
91, ICAO Doc. 9088 A20-EX (Aug. 30, 1973). This description of the events was
not contested during the ICAO meetings. We thus accept it as true.
89 On this issue, see Joanne F. Horvitz, Arab Terrorism and International Aviation:
Deterrence v. The Political Act, 24 CHnrrv's L. J. 145 (1976).
9o See Report and Minutes of the Executive Committee, supra note 88, at 99.
91 See id. at 100.
-92 S.C. Res. 337, U.N. SCOR 174th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/337 (1973).
93 Id. at para. 2.
A' See id. at para. 3.
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civil aircraft in violation of the Chicago Convention.95 Israel was
also strongly condemned for violating sovereign Lebanese air-
space. These examples indicate that a reclassification of a flight
for possible interception in international airspace can be a legit-
imate act when done in the context of a state's fight against ter-
rorism. However, this cannot be used to justify violation of
sovereign airspace. Furthermore, the operation must be care-
fully carried out so as to not endanger civil aviation.
The use of "morality" to help determine the extent to which
an action is right or wrong in a Security Council resolution is
somewhat surprising but nonetheless very interesting. Could
the word "morality" be interpreted as meaning "ethics," or a be-
havior that is adhered to in a customary fashion? Probably, how-
ever, other than to say in which chapter of the U.N. Charter it is
operating under, the Security Council rarely announces within
its resolutions the specific legal basis of its actions. Morality, as
such, is not referred to as a source of international law within
the statute of the International Court of Justice. However,
within the laws regulating the use of force during armed con-
flict,96 we find a text known as the Martens Clause.97 This clause
refers to requirements of "public conscience" or "public opin-
ion" that can probably encompass issues of morality.98 Could it
be that Security Council Resolution 337 articulates an applica-
tion of the Martens Clause in the use of force against civil avia-
tion? Perhaps so. Unfortunately, the characteristic ambiguity of
the UNSC, concerning the legal justification of its acts, leaves
this as a polemical issue.
The global community does not have a universally accepted
interpretation of Article 3(b). This lack of a common interpre-
tation is certainly problematic. As the representative of Iceland
pointed out, because each State can have a different interpreta-
tion of Article 3(b), this creates an "open door," resulting in
95 See ICAO Doc. A20-1.
96 On December 31, 1968, in Resolution 262, the Security Council had con-
demned Israel for premeditated acts of violence for military action against the
Civil International Airport in Beirut.
q7 See Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of
Public Conscience, 94 Am.J. INT'L L. 78 (2000). The Martens Clause limits the use
of force to dictating public conscience, having the effect that what is not specifi-
cally prohibited is not necessarily legal.
98 See Geneva Convention I, supra note 69; see also Geneva Convention II, supra
note 69. Geneva Convention III supra note 69, at art. 142; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Oct. 21, 1950, art.
158, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (hereinafter Geneva Convention IV).
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heterogeneity in national air regulations. 99 The representative
of Japan argued that without a clear interpretation of the func-
tional criteria of Article 3, Japan, and most probably others as
well, "face a serious problem related to the determination of the
status of aircraft, particularly in carrying out activities under the
United Nations framework, as well as, the carriage of persons
and goods for humanitarian purposes."'' ..° The Legal committee
of ICAO has done excellent work in attempting to resolve this
polemic. The global air community can only benefit from a uni-
versally accepted interpretation. If an agreement on the inter-
pretation cannot be established between states, then perhaps an
advisory opinion of the ICJ could clarify the issue.
B. ARTICLE 3(D)
This section will analyze the "due regard" rule codified in Arti-
cle 3(d) of the Chicago Convention. The first section will deter-
mine the content of the norm through a tripartite analysis. The
second section will examine the application of the norm, again
using a tripartite analysis.
1. Content of Due Regard
The extent of the obligation of due regard was not elaborated
within the text of the Chicago Convention itself. This somewhat
obscure principle of what may prima facie appear to be legal am-
phibology has nonetheless been briefly addressed in certain an-
nexes to the Chicago Convention,""z by ICAO in its document, A
Guidance Materials for Aircraft Interceptions, in the Manual Concern-
ing Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazard-
ous to Civil Aircraft Operations,10 2 Procedures for Air Navigation
Services; Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Services, and finally, within
Article 3 of the Chicago Convention." 3 These texts and treaty
dispositions deal with specific applications of the due regard
principle. Specific applications include: matters of interception
of civil aircraft by military aircraft, the possible use of force
against civil aviation, the execution of military operations, which
can be dangerous to civil air navigation, and the military/civil
i9 ICAO Doc. LC/29-wp/2-1 attachment 2, at 19.
100 Id.
I0' Specifically, the principle has been addressed in Annexes 2, 6, Parts I and
II, 10 Volumes I and II, 11, and 15. These annexes are pursuant to Article 37 of
the Chicago Convention.
1'2 See ICAO Doc. 9554-AN/932.
103 See ICAO Doc. 9436.
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communicative interface. Parenthetically, it is important to
note that the civil/military communicative interface norms are
applicable not only to aircraft but also to the entire air traffic
control structure established for military flights. These exam-
ples represent an important part of the generic due regard
norm because they are specific applications of the genus or spe-
cies norm of due regard as an international normative principle.
The "due regard" rule remains the principle treaty obligation
imposed upon States for the regulation of the flight of military
aircraft applicable during times of peace and armed conflict
found within the Chicago Convention. This section will first an-
alyze the due regard concept by a textual deconstruction of the
codified norm. A preliminary conclusion shall be established
pertaining to the content of the due regard obligation. °4 The
conclusions of the first level analysis will represent our proffered
content of the "due regard" norm. This initial conclusion will
also be tested for either confirmation or repudiation through
the subsequent two analytical levels.
A second level of interpretation will then follow through the
analysis of the application of "due regard" in specific situations
as elaborated within various Annexes to the Chicago Conven-
tion. The second level will test our initial conclusions by analyz-
ing two issues. First, our analysis will examine principles
deducted from presuppositions established in the application of
"due regard" in specific circumstances detailed within the An-
nexes to the Chicago Convention.' Second, this section will ana-
lyze the civil military interface by scrutinizing the obligations
imposed on civil air navigation. This second level of analysis is
based on the following two hypotheses. First, elements of "due
regard" that are applicable in specific situations must afortiori be
encompassed within the genus norm, being the general "due re-
gard" principle itself. Second, within the civil/military inter-
M Although several methodologies can be used to extract the meaning of a
normative text, initially, preference should always be given to the ordinary mean-
ing of the terms used within their context. See Maritime Delimitation and Terri-
torial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), 1994 I.CJ. 112
(July 1); see also Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar
and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.) 1995 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 15). Although in this case, the
ICJ did apply the ordinary meaning of the terms within their context and thus
rejected the use of the travaux preparatoire as a supplementary means of interpre-
tation. The dissenting opinion of Justice Schwebel did show that the ordinary
meaning does not necessarily yield the best interpretation. Herein lies the rea-
son of our methodology to use alternate methods of interpretation to evaluate
our initial conclusions derived from the literal interpretation.
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face, the obligations imposed on civil air navigation towards
military airspace use represent the civilian mirror image of the
due regard norm and can thus, help us in determining the con-
tent of its military counterpart.
A third level of interpretation will then examine how the
ICAO applies this concept in its documents and resolutions.
The third level of analysis will establish the same verification
with our initial conclusion and the principles deducted from
ICAO general assembly resolutions.
The second and third levels of interpretation will establish a
confirmation to our proffered normative content deduced
within our first level of interpretation. The denouement of this
process is the illation of the genus norm itself of due regard and
its constituent obligations. As Aristotle argued within his philo-
sophical system,"°5 the form is determined by the totality of the
specific attributes of the subject studied. Thus, by establishing
the attributes of due regard within our three levels of interpreta-
tion, we can deduce the objective normative content of due
regard.
a. Exegetical Analysis
What is the plain meaning of Article 3(d)? Within this section
we will resolve or reduce the text of the norm into its constitu-
ent or component parts, describing their syntactic roles. Thus, a
literary deconstruction of Article 3(d) will help to determine the
content of the treaty norm."0 6 Within the context of the Chi-
105 "Aristotle believed in real definitions. Definitions were true, or not true, of
the thing defined. And a true definition would express the essence of the thing
defined. To do so, it is necessary to relate the term being defined to the large
class of which it is a member, that is, its genus." SeeWILLIAM L. REESE, DICTIONARY
OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION: EASTERN AND WESTERN THOUGHT 29 (1980); see also
WILLIAM DAVID Ross, ARISTOTLE, A COMPLETE EXPOSITION OF His WORKS &
THOUGHT 168 (1960). "To take Aristotle's own instance, the actuality of gram-
matical knowledge cannot be confined to the grasping of a set of universal laws.
The scholar who is interpreting a particular passage is in the fullest sense think-
ing grammatically. And what is true of this science is true of all. One might go
further and say that the actual scientific thought is never concerned with univer-
sals cut off from their particulars, but with universals as the universals of their
particulars." Id.
106 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 60, at art. 31 ("A
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and
purpose."). This principle of treaty interpretation was reiterated by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice where the ICJ stated "the first duty of a tribunal which is
called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty is to endeavor to give
914
MILITARY AIRCRAF-9
cago Convention, the word "due" is an adjective and can be in-
terpreted as implying an inherent right.' °7  Another
connotation of the word "due" can be found in its synonym
words "appropriate" or "rightful," meaning suitable, or more
legalistically, "equitable" or "legitimately entitled to."118 Syntac-
tically viewed, the word "due" is an adjective qualifying the word
"regard." "Regard" is a noun meaning attention, heed, or
care."°9 The word "navigation," again, a noun, can be defined as
the determination of an aircraft's position or course by geome-
try or astronomy.110 Furthermore, according to Article 3(d),
"States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state air-
craft, that they will have due regard." The due regard norm is
thus a formal State undertaking of regulatory content. "Under-
take" is a transitive verb meaning to bind oneself to perform,
make oneself responsible for, to engage in, or to promise to
do.' ' States have thus accepted an obligation to include a due
regard content within their national legal system when promul-
gating regulations affecting the flight of state, and therefore mil-
itary aircraft.
Establishing the correct meaning of the word "when" is also
very important in analyzing Article 3(d). It is equally important
to note that Article 3(d) is also eloquent in what it does not say,
especially when one considers the fact that the word "if' is not
used. The word "when" can be many things, such as an adverb
(interrogative or relative), or a conjunction. In the context of
Article 3(d), the word "when" is a relative adverb introducing a
effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they
occur." See Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to
the United Nations, 1950 I.C.J. 4 (Mar. 3) [hereinafter The Sea and Membership
Case].
107 The Oxford Dictionary also defines "due" as a noun: a person's right-what
is owed to him and legally demandable, See THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY
297 (7th ed. 1999).
108 The concept "due" also presupposes a certain conception ofjustice, as both
"desert" and "entitlement" are key components of justice. For an excellent dis-
cussion of these concepts, see Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Complete Idea ofJustice, 51 U.
CHI. L. REV. 752 (1984) (stating "a person is due no less and no more than he
deserves. Thus, one path towards an understanding ofjustice is to inquire about
desert, and, if desert is not treated simply as a synonym for justice, it furnishes a
test of results reached in other ways."). Id. This question is as old as philosophy
itself and was the subject of the discussion between Socrates and Thracymachus
in Book One of The Republic by Plato.
109 THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY 873 (7th ed. 1999).
110 Id. at 675.
III See id. at 1169.
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subordinate clause expressing time and circumstance, meaning
"on the occasion of." Taken as such, the word "when" presup-
poses that states will enact a regulatory structure governing the
flight of state aircraft. The word "when" excludes the possibility
of discretionary regulatory latitude. Thus, the regulation of the
flight of state aircraft with a pre-established genus paradigmatic
norm of due regard becomes an obligation for contracting
states of the Chicago Convention. For states not to have such an
obligation, the word "when" of Article 3(d) would have to have
been replaced with another word, such as, the word "if' or the
word "should." The word "when" does, however, presuppose a
latitude of time for states to issue such regulations. This latitude
of time must not be interpreted too broadly because this could
result in an unreasonable time lapse, negating the obligation to
regulate.
It is therefore, logical and reasonable to conclude that the
plain meaning of Article 3(d) creates an obligation on states to
regulate state aircraft in order to ensure that state aircraft exer-
cise appropriate attention, as well as, heed and care for the
safety of the course and position of civil aircraft avoiding ob-
struction to the course of and collisions with civil aircraft. Fur-
thermore, as every obligation has a corresponding right, this
interpretation presupposes that civil aviation is legitimately enti-
tled to receive this attention, heed, and care.
The subtleties of Article 3(d) continue because it is also im-
portant to analyze the use of the word "due" in creating this
obligation. The word "due" implies that this obligation results
from an inherent right, attributed to civil aircraft, to receive at-
tention, heed, or care to the safety of their course or position
from state aircraft. The "due regard" rule thus creates a recip-
rocal obligation upon the institutions entrusted with the con-
duct of civil navigation to co-operate with and facilitate in the
application of the care, heed, and attention given by military
flights to the safety of the course and position of civil aircraft.
Furthermore, air navigation authorities must encourage the exe-
cution of this obligation towards civil air navigation.
b. Analysis of the Annexes to the Chicago Convention
As a second level of analysis, the Annexes to the Chicago Con-
vention can be very enlightening.
916 [66
2001] MILITARY AIRCRAFT 917
ANNEX 2
Annex 2112 deals with a specific application of "due regard"
pertaining to the interception11  of civil aircraft1 4 by military
aircraft. The purpose of Annex 2 is to ensure safe interceptions.
In addition, clear communications aim to reduce possible mis-
understandings. Thus, rules of visual communication between
military and civil aircraft are established as a universal language
of the air. For example, a military pilot can signal to a civilian
pilot "you have been intercepted, follow me,"' 5 or "Land at this
aerodrome." I" The civil pilot may signal his compliance with
the order 1 7 or reply by "aerodrome you have designated is inad-
equate,""" "cannot comply," 19 or "in distress."' 21 Contracting
112 It is important to note that Annex 2 has special status as it contains only
standards and no recommended practices.
113 The meaning of the word "interception" within this annex excludes inter-
cept and escort service provided on request to aircraft in distress, which have
specific rights according to Article 25 of the Chicago Convention. See Chicago
Convention, supra note 23, at arts. 25 and 61.
114 Annex 2, § 3.8.1 reads as follows:
Interception of civil aircraft shall be governed by appropriate regu-
lations and administrative directives issued by Contracting States in
compliance with the Convention on International Civil Aviation,
and in particular Article 3(d) under which Contracting States un-
dertake, when issuing regulations for their State aircraft, to have
due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft. Accordingly,
in drafting appropriate regulations and administrative directives
due regard shall be had to the provisions of Appendix 1, Section 2
and Appendix 2, Section 1.
See ICAO, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS, RULES OF THE AIR, ANNEX 2 TO THE CON-
VENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION (9th ed. July 1990) [hereinafter An-
nex 2].
115 These are precise aerial maneuvers. For example, this specific command is
done by "rocking aircraft and flashing navigational lights at irregular intervals
(and landing lights in the case of a helicopter) from a position slightly above and
ahead of, and normally to the left of the intercepted aircraft (or to the right if the
intercepted aircraft is a helicopter) and, after acknowledgement, a slow level
turn, normally to the left .... on the desired heading." Annex 2, app. 1 § 2.1,
supra note 114, at 22.
116 This maneuver can be shown by "lowering landing gear... showing steady
landing lights and overfly runway in use or, if the intercepted aircraft is a helicop-
ter, overflying the helicopter landing area." Id.
117 The pilot shows compliance by "rocking aircraft, flashing navigational lights
at irregular intervals and following." Id.
118 The civil pilot replies by "raising landing gear and flashing landing lights
while passing over runwayin use ..... Id. at app. 11 § 2.2.
119 The civil pilot shows non-compliance by "regular switching on and off of all
available lights but in such a manner as to be distinct from flashing lights." Id.
120 The civil pilot shows distress by "irregular flashing of all available lights."
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states are urged to assure that their military pilots strictly'adhere
to specific signals when intercepting civil aircrafts.1 2 1 These
standards of aircraft interceptions apply to national airspace and
within international airspace over the high seas. 122
Annex 2 also establishes the contents of a flight plan, 121 which
are:
Aircraft identification
Flight rules and type of flight






Route to be followed
Destination aerodrome and total estimated elapsed time
Alternate aerodrome (s)
Fuel endurance
Total number of persons on board
Emergency and survival equipment
Other information.
Annex 2 describes several situations when a flight plan must
be deposited for civil air navigation. One of the stated reasons
for depositing a flight plan is the requirement by the appropri-
ate ATS authority in order to facilitate co-ordination with mili-
tary units, to avoid the possibility of interception.1 24
ANNEX 10125
Annex 10 contains provisions regulating aeronautical commu-
nications, navigation, and surveillance. Strictly speaking, Chi-
cago system state aircraft are not directly bound by these rules.
Military and other Chicago state aircraft must, nonetheless, ex-
121 SeeAnnex 2, supra note 114, at § 3.8.1.
122 "The [ICAO Council] resolved, in adopting Annex 2 in April 1948 and
Amendment 1 to the said Annexes in November 1951, that the Annex constitutes
Rules relating to the flight and manoeuvre of aircraft within the meaning of Article 12
of the [Chicago] Convention. Over the high seas, therefore these rules apply
without exception." See id. § 2.1.1.
123 See id. § 3.3.2.
124 hI. § 3.3.1.1 (d).
125 ICAO, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES, AERO-
NAUTICAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS, ANNEX 10 TO THE CONVENTION ON
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AvIATION, VOL. III (lst ed. 1995) [hereinafter Annex 10].
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ercise due regard towards Annex 10 operations by not interfer-
ing with civil aeronautical navigation, communication, and
surveillance.
ANNEX 11i26
Annex 11 contains within its Chapter 2, certain dispositions
for coordination between military authorities and civilian
ATS. lzv Annex 11 Standards and Recommended Practices are
applicable not only within the airspace under the jurisdiction of
a contracting state where ATS are provided, but also wherever a
contracting state accepts the responsibility of providing air traf-
fic services over the high seas or in airspace of undetermined
sovereignty. 128 The subsections of section 2.1b of Annex 11,
which are of prime importance to this analysis in establishing
the military/civil interface, are as follows:
2.16.1 Air traffic services authorities shall establish and
maintain close co-operation with military authorities responsi-
ble for activities that may affect flights of civil aircraft.
2.16.2 Co-ordination of activities potentially hazardous to
civil aircraft shall be effected in accordance with 2.17.
2.16.3 Arrangements shall be made to permit information
relevant to the safe and expeditious conduct of flights of civil
aircraft to be promptly exchanged between air traffic services
units and appropriate military units.
2.16.3.1 Air traffic services units shall either routinely or on
request, in accordance with locally agreed procedures; pro-
vide appropriate military units with pertinent flight plan and
other data concerning flights of civil aircraft...
2.17.1 The arrangements for activities potentially hazardous
to civil aircraft, whether over the territory of a State or over
the high seas, shall be co-ordinated with the appropriate air
traffic services authorities. The co-ordination shall be ef-
fected early enough to permit timely promulgation of infor-
126 ICAO, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES, AIR
TRAFFIC SERVICES, ANNEX 11 TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
AVIATION (11 th ed. July 1997) [hereinafter Annex 111].
17 See generally id. § 2.16 (co-ordination between military authorities and air
traffic services).
128 Id. at Foreward; see also ICAO Doc. C-WP/8803, § 2.3.1 ("As formulated, the
provisions apply to co-operation within a State as well as to co-operation between
military authorities of one State and the ATS authorities of other States, and
whether the activities affect flights over the territories of states or over the high
seas.").
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mation regarding the activities in accordance with the
provisions of Annex 15.129
Civil air traffic services have an obligation to establish and
maintain communications with military flight authorities. 131
Furthermore, section 2.15.1 of Annex 11 specifically provides
that:
Air traffic services units, in carrying out their objectives, shall
have due regard for the requirements of the operators conse-
quent on their obligations as specified in Annex 6, and, if so re-
quired by the operators, shall make available to them or their
designated representatives such information as may be available
to enable them or their designated representatives to carry out
their responsibilities. 131
We believe that this obligation is reciprocal for military air
authorities and forms the important element of the attributes of
due regard. This mutual obligation presupposes a state of sym-
biosis between military and civil air space. Their existence is in-
extricably linked together. Civil air traffic services need
information on military flights and use of air space in order to
accomplish their obligations of ensuring safety in air navigation
through the coordination of airspace use. 3 2 Reciprocally, mili-
tary authorities need as much information on civil air traffic in
order to execute not only their own due regard obligation, but
also their obligation of national defense and to reduce and even
perhaps, eliminate the need for aerial interceptions.'33 The ob-
jective sought within this close civil/military cooperation is the
avoidance of hazards to civil air navigation and a minimal of
interference on the operations of civil flights from state air-
129 Annex 11, supra note 126 at §§ 2.16.1-2.16.3.1, 2.17.1 (emphasis added).
130 "[A]ir traffic services authorities shall establish and maintain close co-oper-
ation with military authorities responsible for activities that may affect flights of
civil aircraft, and... arrangements shall be made to permit prompt exchange of
information relevant to the safe and expeditious conduct of flights of civil air-
craft." ICAO Doc. C-WP/8803 § 2.3.1.
131 Annex 11, supra note 126, at § 2.15.1 (emphasis added).
132 ATS authorities have an obligation to initiate the promulgation of informa-
tion forwarded to the aeronautical information service (AIS) of the state, which is
responsible for issuing the requisite NOTAM. See ICAO, INTERNATIONAL STAN-
DARDS AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICE, AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION SERVICES, AN-
NEX 15 TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVITION, Chapter 5 (10th
ed. July 1997) [hereinafter Annex 15].




craft. ) 3 4 These underlying principles and objectives help define
the "due regard" concept as a genus normative principle of the
Chicago system. When military flights are over the high seas,
ICAO recommends that the military/civil coordination "should
be effected through the ATS authority responsible for the air-
space over the State where the organization is located."' 35 ATS
communication facilities must be equipped for rapid and relia-
ble communication with military units.'"
ANNEX 15
Chapter 5 deals with another specific application of "due re-
gard" in the issuing of a NOTAM. 1 7 During certain military op-
erations, a NOTAM is to be issued. Such cases include the
following: if there are military exercises which can be hazardous
to air navigation,138 if there is a possibility of interceptions, 3"
operations of humanitarian relief taken under the auspices of
the United Nations, which can affect civil air navigation, 40 and
for any other military air operation of operationally significant
circumstance.' 4
Appendix 1 of Annex 15 deals with the content of navigation
warnings for military exercises and training areas. Specific in-
formation must be included when warning civil air navigation
authorities of these activities. Warnings must include the pre-
cise description of the airspace during such activity with specific
geographical coordinates, including upper and lower limits.' 42
134 See id. ("[T]he objective of the co-ordination shall be to achieve the best
arrangements which will avoid hazards to civil aircraft and minimize interference
with normal operations of such aircraft.").
135 !d. § 2.17.1.1.
136 See id. §§ 6.2.2.2.2 (a) and 6.2.2.2.3. "The communication facilities shall
include provisions for communications by direct speech permitting communica-
tions to be established normally within fifteen seconds, and provisions for printed
communications, when a written record is required." ICAO Doc. C-WP/8803,
§ 2.4.1.
1117 A NOTAM is defined as being "[a] notice distributed by means of telecom-
munication containing information concerning the establishment, condition or
change in any aeronautical facility, service, procedure or hazard, the timely
knowledge of which is essential to personnel concerned with flight operations."
See Annex 15, supra note 132, at ch. 2 (Definitions).
138 See id. § 5.1.1(1).
139 See id. § 5.1.1(o).
140 See id. § 5.1.1(w).
141 See id. § 5.1.1.3.
142 See id. at App.1, ENR 5.2 (military exercise and training areas).
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From the above cited texts, we see that specific applications of
the "due regard" norm have stressed the communicative aspect
of the rule. Only certain military activities must be disclosed to
civil air authorities. It is important to stress that not all military
aircraft are subject to disclosure. However, civil air navigation
must actively participate in establishing a secure environment
for itself by informing the military air authorities of its own activ-
ities. The specific application of "due regard" applies a recipro-
cal obligation of communication between the civil and military
air authorities. Furthermore, civil ATS have an obligation to co-
ordinate the hybrid use of airspace. The coordination of air-
space use is done in the interest of the greater principles of
safety and efficiency of use of a limited area for all those that
utilize this medium. This communicative dimension will only
gain in importance as civil air transportation greatly expands
within the new millennium.
By transporting the attributes of the specific norm to the ge-
neric norm, we can deduce the following: First, the genus "due
regard" norm possesses an important utilitarian conceptual
foundation. 14- Second, communications represent the essence
of the obligation rights and duties of those who use airspace.
The exchange of information pertaining to airspace use by
those who utilize the medium is thus, intrinsic to the norm and
is an indispensable element of "due regard." This, in turn, pre-
supposes a duty within the "due regard" rule to facilitate and
encourage the flow of data. The conclusions of this second level
analysis are consistent with the conclusions reached by the first
level.
c. Analysis of the ICAO Resolutions
As a third level of treaty interpretation, we can examine ICAO
resolutions to see how this governing body and its members
have perceived Article 3(d).' 44 International organizations act
1' We see utilitarianism as " [t]he doctrine that the principle of greatest utility
should be the criterion in ethical matters, and that the criterion is to be applied
to the consequences flowing from ethical decisions." W.L. REESE, DICTIONARY OF
PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION 601 (1980). Furthermore, this principle is one of rule
utilitarianism. Rule utilitarianism "does not consider the consequences of each
particular action but considers the consequences of adopting some general rule."
Rule utilitarianism "adopts the rule if the consequences of its general adoption
are better than those of the adoption of some alternative rule." See THE ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 206 (Paul Edwards ed., 1972).
'44 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 60, at art. 31(3) (b).
Article 31(3)(b) states: "[t]here shall be taken into account, together with the
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and speak through resolutions. One must, however, determine
the legal value of these resolutions.'45 Resolutions of interna-
tional organizations are not included within Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice as a source of inter-
national law. Resolutions can be used as evidence of opino iuris
et necessitatis in the establishment of international customary law.
Resolutions by an international organization pertaining to the
interpretation of its constitutive documents can be authoritative
in establishing the accuracy of treaty interpretation. '46
ICAO Assembly Resolutions A14-25, A21-21, 47 and 32-14 Ap-
pendix P deal with civil and military air traffic. The second con-
sideration of resolution A21-21 specifically mentions the
obligation of States to include, within their regulatory structure
for State aircrafts, due regard for civil air navigation. 4 ' Resolu-
tion 32-14 Appendix P reiterates this principle.'49 In both reso-
lutions, the ICAO Assembly stresses that the use of common air
space must be structured as to assure the safety, regularity, and
efficiency of international air traffic. It is important to note that
ICAO Resolution 32-14 also encourages Contracting States to
take the necessary initiative to improve the coordination be-
tween civil and military flights."" Furthermore, Appendix P of
ICAO Resolution 32-14 stresses the application of Annex 2 in
international air space.' 51 We believe that these ICAO resolu-
context.... any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which estab-
lishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation."
145 For an interesting analysis, see Oscar Schacter, Law-Making in the United Na-
tions, in PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 120-137 (Nardasiri Jasentuliyana
ed. 1995).
146 "When an organization is empowered to take decisions by majority vote, it is
inevitable that the practice supported by the majority of the member states will
come to be regarded as the practice of the organization itself, and will be used as
a means of interpreting the treaty setting up the organization, despite the fact
that the practice in question is opposed by a minority of the menber states."
PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
366 (7th ed. 1997).
147 Although Resolution A 21-21 is no longer in force, its substance remains in
Resolution 3214, Appendix P.
148 See ICAO, ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION A 21-21.
149 Article 2 of Appendix P states "the regulations and procedures established
by Contracting States to govern the operation of their State Aircraft over the high
seas shall ensure that these operations do not compromise the safety, regularity
and efficiency of international civil air traffic and that, to the extent practicable,
these operations comply with the rules of the air in Annex 2." ICAO Doc. 9554-
Arv/932.
150 See ICAO, ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 32-14.
151 See id. at app. P.
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tions confirm our parsing of Article 3(d). The fact that these
principles were reiterated in two resolutions leaves no doubt-
ICAO perceives the due regard norm as an essential obligation
in creating safer skies.
Another ICAO document that helps to decrypt the "due re-
gard' concept is the Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to
Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Opera-
tions."'52 Although this document elaborates specific rules for
particular situations, the document is, nonetheless, very enlight-
ening in showing the importance of ATS-civil-military obliga-
tions and the respective duties of all parties to facilitate this
communicative interface. According to this document, certain
military activities are considered significantly dangerous to civil
navigation.'53 ICAO stresses that such military operations
should be coordinated with ATS authorities. Furthermore,
when military activities can pose a danger to civil air navigation,
ATC authorities must remain alert and react accordingly in co-
ordinating air traffic and reduce risks. 154 Again, this document
is germane to our interpretative argumentation.
The Procedures for Air Navigation Services - Rules of the Air and
Air Traffic Services (PANS-RAC)155 is also applicable to the mili-
tary/civil interface. This document is complementary to the
Standards and Recommended Practices of Annex 2 Rules of the
Air, and to Annex 11 Air Traffic Services, and when necessary, is
supplemented by regional procedures. 156 Procedures for Air
Navigation Services (PANS) are approved by the Council and
152 ICAO Doc. 9554-AN/932.
153 These military activities are listed in section 3.2 as follows:
a) practice firing or testing of any weapons air-to-air, air-to-surface,
surface-to-air or surface-to-surface in an area or in a manner that
could affect civil air traffic;
b) certain military aircraft operations such as displays, training ex-
ercises, and the intentional dropping of objects or of paratroopers;
c) launch and recovery of space vehicles; and
d) operations in areas of conflict, or the potential for armed con-
flict, when such operations include a potential threat to civil air
traffic.
154 Article 3.2.1 states "ATS authorities should be alert to military operations in
areas of conflict, or the potential for armed conflict, when such operations in-
clude a potential for hazardous activity, and react accordingly." Id. at art. 3.2.1.
155 ICAO Doc. 4444-RAC/501.
156 Id. § 1.
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are recommended for worldwide application. 157 However, it is
important to note that PANS are not subject to the Chicago
Convention Article 38 notifications in case of non-
implementation.
This document acknowledges that some military aeronautical
flight operations may require non-compliance with established
air traffic procedures. In order to maintain safe skies, it is rec-
ommended that in such cases the appropriate military authori-
ties shall be asked, whenever practicable, to notify the proper
civil air traffic control unit before the execution of such maneu-
vers. 15  Furthermore, section 6.2 applies this principle to air-
craft separation stating "a reduction of separation minima
required by military necessity or other extraordinary circum-
stances shall only be accepted by an air traffic control unit when
a specific request in some recorded form has been obtained
from the authority having jurisdiction over the aircraft
concerned."
It is important to stress that section 6.2 would not apply dur-
ing times of armed conflict. Furthermore, it is interesting to
note the use of the concept "military necessity" within this sec-
tion. Military necessity was defined within the Hostage Case in
1948 as "[im] ilitary necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the
laws of war, to apply any amount and kind of force to compel
the complete submission of the enemy with the least possible
expenditure of time, life and money."'15 9
Military necessity is a legal justification for extraordinary ac-
tions during armed conflict. The concept of military necessity
by definition cannot be subject to prior written approval by civil
authorities. Although we certainly understand the concern for
separation minima during times of peace, the wording of this
disposition should be reviewed. Nonetheless, the fact that
within this document extraordinary circumstances justifying the
use of military necessity is subject to a communication protocol
with ATS authorities indicates the importance the ICAO Coun-
cil places upon civil/military communications to ensure safer
skies.
157 The procedures are different for Standards and Recommended Practices,
which are subject to Articles 37 and 90 of the Chicago Convention.
15s ICAO Doc. 4444-RAC/501, § 6.1.
15i 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 275 (1989); see also Burrus
M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origins and Limits of the
Principle of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 213 (1998).
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Lastly, section 6.3 deals with large formation military
flights. 1 ' In such cases, arrangements for the reservations of
the use of airspace should be made between the military user
and the appropriate ATS authority. This coordination is to be
made according to Annex 11 with publications of such uses in
conformity with Annex 15.
Despite the unfortunate use of the concept of "military neces-
sity" within this document, the text, nonetheless, corroborates
the importance of precise and timely communication between
military and civil air traffic authorities in creating safe skies.
This third level of analysis corroborates the first two.
2. Application of Due Regard
This note will now analyze the application of the due regard
norm. We will use a tripartite analytical methodology to review
the application of the due regard norm. First, the legal form
will be analyzed, that is, how is this obligation of States to be
executed? Second, the physical dimension of its execution will
be analyzed, that is, spatially, where does this obligation apply?
And third, the manner or methods in which the obligation is to
be executed will be analyzed.
a. How is Due Regard Applied?
How is this obligation of "due regard" executed? First, as a
question of form, Article 3(d) stipulates that the "due regard"
norm must be included within a State's regulations. 6 ' The
word "regulation" can be defined as being "[t]he act or process
of controlling by rule or restriction" and "[a] rule or order, hav-
ing legal force, issued by an administrative agency or a local gov-
ernment."' 6 2 We believe that the word "regulation" must be
subject to a broad interpretation in order to include military or-
ders, including rules of engagement given by the military hierar-
160 See ICAO Doc. 4444-RAC/501, § 6.3.
161 See Chicago Convention, supra note 23, at art. 3(d).
162 BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1289 (7th ed. 1999). The Interpretation Act of
Canada R.S.C. Ch. 1-21, defines the word "regulation" as including:
[a]n order, regulation, rule, rule of court, form, tariff of costs or
fees, letters patent, commission, warrant, proclamation, by-law, res-
olution or other instrument issued, made or established in the exe-
cution of a power conferred by or under the authority of an Act, or
by or under the authority of the Governor in council.
This definition has a drafting lacunae and is somewhat circular as it is included
within the definition the word being defined.
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chy to its pilots and air traffic controllers. Military institutions
have a specific form of regulatory structure called orders or mis-
sion accomplishment rules. We argue that a restrictive interpre-
tation excluding the application of Article 3(d) to military
orders would reduce in an unreasonable manner the scope of
applicability of the said article, negatively affecting the safety of
civil air navigation. Considering the preamble to the Chicago
Convention, a broad interpretation of this norm, assuring the
maximum applicability of safety, is de rigueur.16- Canada and the
U.S. have applied a broad interpretation incorporating the due
regard norm within military orders.
b. Where is Due Regard Applicable?
Where is this obligation applicable? The obligation of due
regard is to be executed within international air space. The
question, however, remains as to whether or not this obligation
of regulatory content also extends to the regulation of State air-
craft within national air space. Article 3(d) does not distinguish
different physical areas of applicability of the "due regard" obli-
gation. The answer to this question resides in the breadth of the
interpretation one gives to Article 3(d). A restrictive interpreta-
tion would limit the extent of this obligation to only interna-
tional air space. After all, Article 1 of the Chicago Convention
codifies a customary norm that a "State has complete and exclu-
sive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory." '164 On the
other hand, an expansive interpretation would apply the "due
regard" norm to regulatory structures governing national air-
space. International practice has not established a consensus on
this interpretative debate. 6 5 We, however, believe that an ex-
163 Chicago Convention, supra note 23, at pmbl.
164 Id. art. 1.
165 USAF practice indicates the use of a restrictive interpretation, applying Arti-
cle 3(d) to only international air space. According to Air Force Instructions 13-
201 dated April 1 1998, by order of the Secretary of the Air Force, the "due
regard rule is not applicable for territorial airspace of any nation or state, Inter-
national Straights overlapped by territorial seas, Archipelago Sea Lanes or Con-
tiguous zones." The ICAO Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Militay
Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Operations proffers an expansive in-
terpretation in Article 3.1:
Co-ordination between the responsible military authorities and the
appropriate ATS authorities is essential to the safety of civil aircraft
operations whenever activities potentially hazardous to such opera-
tions are planned and conducted by any military units. The "appro-
priate ATS authority" is, by definition, "the relevant authority
designated by the State responsible for providing air traffic services
92720011
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pansive interpretation is more consistent with the stated goals of
the Chicago Convention as indicated within the preamble.
c. Methods of Executing Due Regard
What are the manners and methods of executing due regard?
In analyzing the practice of States, we see that there are two
manners in which military aircraft have been instructed to exer-
cise due regard while in international airspace. A military pilot
can either operate independently of air traffic controllers or act
as his own air controller,'66 ensuring proper separation between
his aircraft and civil aircraft within his area of operation. Or as a
second option, a pilot may function in a synergy with civil air
control authorities.'67 We believe that the choice of method of
in the airspace concerned. This co-ordination is necessary regard-
less of whether the activities take place over the territories of States,
over the high seas, or over territories of undetermined sovereignty,
and whether the military and ATS authorities belong to the same or
different States.
ICAO Doc. 9554-AN/932 art. 3.1
ii ; See Use of Airspace by U.S. Military Aircraft and Firings Over the High Seas, De-
partment of Defense Directive Number 4540.1 (January 13, 1981).
Article 5.3.2.1 states:
Generally there are operational situations that do not lend them-
selves to ICAO flight procedures such as: military contingencies;
classified missions; politically sensitive missions; or routine aircraft
carrier operations or other training activities. Operations not con-
ducted under ICAO flight procedures are conducted under the
"due regard" or "operational" prerogative of military aircraft and
are subject to one or more of the following conditions:
5.3.2.1.1. Aircraft shall be operated in visual meteorological
conditions; or
5.3.2.1.2. Aircraft shall be operated within radar surveillance
and radio communications of a surface radar facility; or
5.3.2.1.3. Aircraft shall be equipped with airborne radar that is
sufficient to provide separation between themselves, aircraft they
may be controlling, and other aircraft; or
5.3.2.1.4. Aircraft shall be operated outside controlled airspace.
5.3.2.2 The above conditions provide for a level of safety
equivalent to that normally given by ICAO air traffic control agen-
cies; and fulfill U.S. Government obligations tinder Article 3 of the
Chicago Convention of 1944 (reference (d)), which stipulates
there must be "due regard for the safety of navigation of civil air-
craft" when flight is not being conducted under ICAO flight proce-
dures. Essentially, flight under the "due regard" or "operational"
option obligates the military aircraft commander to be his own air
traffic control agency and to separate his aircraft from all other air
traffic.
617 See Air Force Instruction 13-201 1, § 1.7.3 (April, 1998) ("when possible,
accomplish prior coordination for "Due Regard" with the agency responsible for
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execution must be determined by whether we are dealing with
times of unclassified peacetime operations or times of armed
conflict when using mission accomplishment rules, which neces-
sarily presupposes a degree of secrecy of the operation, or dur-
ing peacetime classified military operations. 6 ' Furthermore,
Article 3(d) must be interpreted in harmony with other norms
of international public law. The right of States to collective or
individual self-defense is now a well-established norm conven-
tionally articulated within Article 51 of the Charter of the
providing air traffic services."). See also Department of Defense Directive Number
4540.1, art. 5 (Jan.13, 1981).
OPERATING PROCEDURES
5.1. Selection of Operating Areas. Flight Operations shall be con-
ducted away from high density air traffic areas, when possible. Ar-
eas for aircraft and firing activities shall be so selected as not to
interfere with established air routes and ocean shipping lanes. In
establishing firing exercise areas, every effort shall be made to con-
fine activities to warning areas, altitude reservations (stationary or
moving), other special-use airspace, or any other combination
thereof. Arrangements for airspace or altitude reservations shall be
made through the appropriate airspace or altitude reservation facil-
ity such as Central Altitude Reservation Facility (CARF), European
and Pacific CARF. The Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to
Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Operations
states:
The first step in the normal co-ordination process is the transmis-
sion, or delivery, of a message to the appropriate ATS authority
or authorities containing details of the planned activity. This
message should describe the nature of the activity, the geograph-
ical area(s) affected, including its horizontal and vertical dimen-
sion(s), the proposed date(s), time(s) and duration(s) of the
activity, and any special safety measures to be taken if necessary,
and the means and methods of co-ordination between participat-
ing military units and ATS units concerned, including use of ra-
dio communications. In other words, a flight plan.
ICAO Doc. 9554-AN/932 art. 3.6.
143 As an example, the U.S. Department of Defense applies this principle in
the following manner:
4.2. It is the policy of the Department of Defense that all U.S.
military aircraft and firings shall operate with due regard for the
safety of all air and surface traffic. Further, when practical and
compatible with the mission, U.S. military aircraft operating on the
high seas shall observe:
4.2.1 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) flight
procedures.
4.2.2 Reasonable warning procedures with regard to military
aircraft of all nations and the Soviet Union, in accordance with U.S.
- U.S.S.R. agreement, See Department of Defense Directive Num-
ber 4540.1 January 13, 1981.
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United Nations. Article 3(d) does not modify the right of self-
defense in any way. Military air operations are an important as-
pect of self-defense of States. Thus, Article 3(d) cannot be inter-
preted in a manner, which would reduce the efficacy of air
operations in the defense of States. Nonetheless, the "due re-
gard" rule must still be part of mission accomplishment rules
during military operations. Furthermore, one must consider
the efficacy of these methods with the proper operation of civil
aviation as determined within the Chicago Convention. Depos-
iting a flight plan with ATC authorities during peace time when
flying in international airspace, allows both civil and military air-
crafts to efficiently execute their respective rights and duties re-
sulting from international law while being supervised and
coordinated by a single air control authority.' In order to
achieve this operational efficiency, we argue that the "due re-
gard" rule must be interpreted in function with the preamble' 7"
of the Chicago Convention, which reads:
Whereas it is desirable to avoid friction and to promote that co-
operation between nations and peoples upon which peace of the
world depends;
Therefore, the undersigned governments having agreed on cer-
tain principles and arrangements in order that international civil
aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly manner and that
international air transport services may be established on the ba-
sis of equality of opportunity and operated soundly and economi-
cally...
The choice of method of execution of the "due regard" obli-
gation must be, given the conditions existing at the time, the
most secure and economically viable, while simultaneously re-
specting the rights of States to defend themselves. The optimal
manner of executing this obligation is in cooperation with civil
authorities, unless mission accomplishment rules or other na-
tional security imperatives prevent this from happening. For ex-
"n. On this issue, see ICAO Doc 8027-C/920, Action of the Council, 37th Sess.
18.
170 See Chicago Convention, supra note 23, at pmbl. (emphasis added).
Article 31: 1. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties "A
Treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty
shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble.
930
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ample, if there is going to be an aerial bombing of a belligerent
State, one cannot reasonably expect that a flight plan will be
deposited with civil authorities. In this case, the pilot will be his
own flight controller and assure proper separation. On the
other hand, a military aircraft conducting an unclassified rou-
tine flight should deposit a flight plan with civil navigation au-
thorities as a due regard for civil navigation. In knowing the
position and course of military flights, civil navigation authori-
ties can better assure the security of civil air navigation.
IV. CAA-CANADA LITIGATION
International air traffic control authorities have the right to
charge civil aviation for the use of their navigational services as
required by Article 15 of the Chicago Convention.' What is
the legal status of military aircraft in regards to the fees con-
tained within Article 15 of the Chicago Convention?
Every airport in a contracting State which is open to public use
by its national aircraft shall likewise, subject to the provisions of
Article 68, be open under uniform conditions to the aircraft of all
the other contracting States. The like uniform conditions shall ap-
ply to the use, by aircraft of every contracting State, of all air naviga-
tion facilities, including radio and meteorological services, which
may be provided for public use for the safety and expedition of air
navigation. Any charges that may be imposed or permitted to be
imposed by a contracting State for the use of such airports and air
navigation facilities by the aircraft of any other contracting state
shall not be higher, (a) As to aircraft not engaged in scheduled
international air services, than those that would be paid by its na-
tional aircraft of the same class engaged in similar operations, and
(b) As to aircraft engaged in scheduled international air ser-
vices, than those that would be paid by its national aircraft engaged
in similar international air services.
All such charges shall be published and communicated to the
International Civil Aviation Organization: provided that, upon rep-
resentation by an interested contracting State, the charges imposed
for the use of airports and other facilities shall be subject to review
by the Council, which shall report and make recommendations
thereon for consideration of the State or States concerned. No
fees, dues or other charges shall be imposed by any contracting
State in respect solely of the right of transit over or entry into or
exit from its territory of any aircraft of a contracting State or per-
sons or property thereon.
Chicago Convention, supra note 23, at art. 15.
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The Civil Aviation Authority 17 2 (CAA) deposited proceedings
in the Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division, on September
10, 1998,' claiming the right to collect unpaid fees from the
Canadian federal government for air navigation services made
available by the CAA to Canadian military aircraft. 74 According
to the Statement of Claim, the fees claimed by the CAA included
"information, direction, and other facilities issued or provided
in connection with the navigation or movement of aircraft over
the North Atlantic."175
A. CAA ARGUMENTS
In justifying its claim, the CAA proffered several arguments.
Briefly stated, the CAA argued that the service charges estab-
lished by Shanwick Oceanic were not taxes but actually fees that
were charged "to defray the costs of providing facilities and ser-
vices for aircraft flights over the high seas."' 76 It states:
More particularly, it is inherent to the system established by the
Chicago Convention and the instruments elaborated thereunder
that, in relation to the CAA as the designated ATC authority for
Shanwick Oceanic, aircraft operators intending to fly in
Shanwick Oceanic shall, in compliance with the domestic law of
the country of the aircraft, file or cause to be filed flight plans
with the CAA, shall make use of the CAA services within
Shanwick Oceanic and, more particularly in this respect, shall,
inter alia, obtain CAA clearance upon entering Shanwick
Oceanic, abide by CAA ATC instructions (including standing in-
structions contained in the CAA NA-MNPS), provide position re-
ports to the CAA ATC authority and maintain continuous radio
watch within Shanwick Oceanic. 177
The U.K. laws did not require foreign aircraft to submit to the
CAA air traffic control services while over the high seas. Rather,
172 A corporate body, with juridictional status and capacity established under
and continued pursuant to the laws of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland.
173 See Court File Number T-1772-98. A statement of claim had previously been
deposited before the Superior Court of Quebec in Montreal. CSM 500-05-021967-
961.
174 These proceedings have now been discontinued. Although the settlement
presently remains classified, Canada will no longer be receiving bills from the
CAA and will not pay the past ones. Despite the discontinuance, an analysis of
the respective arguments remains useful.
175 Statement of Claim T-1772-98, p. 3 para. 10,
176 Id. at 10.
177 /d. at 9-10.
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it is argued that it is the domestic law of the country of the air-
craft that provides for such action.'78 Under Regulation 6 of the
Civil Aviation Regulations, which was adopted under the author-
ity of the CAA Act, the operator of every aircraft that flies within
the Shanwick Oceanic Control Area and in respect of which, a
flight plan is communicated to the appropriate air control unit
in relation to its flight in that area, shall pay to the CAA, for the
navigation services made available by its in relation to that flight,
a charge. 17
9
In Canada, under the Canadian Forces Flying Orders,
"[m]ilitary assignment permitting, aircraft in international air-
space shall comply with the SARPs of the ICAO."
Section 5 provides that: "operation of Canadian Forces air-
craft and military aircraft of a foreign state are further governed
by procedures and special notices contained in FLIPs, NOTAMs
AOIs and instructions issued by ATC agencies."
Thus, the CAA continued its arguments on a contractual basis
proffering that by duly communicating appropriate flight plans,
by requesting the CAA services, by initiating communications
with the CAA, by commanding or otherwise allowing Canadian
forces military aircraft to enter Shanwick Oceanic, and by mak-
ing use of the CAA services with full knowledge of the require-
ment to pay the CAA service charges, . the Canadian
Government, as operator of the Canadian Forces military air-
craft, in obedience with the requirements of the Canadian fed-
eral law, brought itself within the obligation to pay the CAA's air
navigation service charges. 8 "
Therefore, the relation created was claimed to be contractual
in nature, and the Canadian Government had freely and volun-
tarily, contractually bound itself to pay the navigation charges to
the CAA. 81
In the alternative, the CAA argued that using the CAA services
and not paying for the services consumed had unjustly enriched
the Canadian Government to the detriment of the CAA.'8 2 The
CAA further argued that the payment of fees for air navigation
services over international air space had been accepted by inter-
178 Id. at 11.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 22.
181 See Statement of Claim T-1772-98, p.3 para. 106.
182 See id. at 23
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national practice of states and listed a number of states, which
had in fact paid these fees.
B. DEFENSE BY CANADA
In rebutting the CAA pleadings, Canada argued that this issue
was, in fact, a matter of international relations between two sov-
ereign states concerning the status and liability of State aircraft.
This issue involved the performance of acts Iure imperii, includ-
ing the rules of customary international law concerning state
sovereignty and immunity and the freedom of flight of state air-
craft, including military aircraft, over the high seas. The issue
was not properly justiciable in domestic courts, and Canada was
attempting to resolve the issue through the sole appropriate
means, that is, diplomatic channels.
Canada denied that the charges were fees and argued that
they were in fact taxes. Canada proffered that the taxes were
not applicable to state military aircraft on the grounds of sover-
eign immunity. Canada refuted CAA's contractually based argu-
ment and denied that its domestic laws required military
airplanes to purchase CAA services.'
Canada insisted on the normative dichotomy created in Chi-
cago between civil and state aircraft. Canada also insisted that
the International Civil Aviation Atlantic Airspace Management
System is relevant with respect to military aircraft traffic over the
North Atlantic region, only insofar as it may accommodate the
undertaking of the contracting states to the Chicago Conven-
tion found in Article 3(d), to have due regard, when issuing reg-
ulations or instructions for State aircraft. Thus, it allows for an
optimum use of airspace, with a maximum level of safety for
both civil and military flights." 4 Canada further qualified these
actions as a policy decision of the Canadian government involv-
ing acts of international comity."8 5
Canada argued that its practice was consistent with the rules
of customary international law. The argument was based on the
principles of State sovereignty and immunity, as well as, on the
freedom of flight over the high seas. Thus, military aircraft are
exempt, barring an international agreement to the contrary,
from the imposition and payment, inter alia, of charges related
83 Id. at 10.
181 See id. at 12.
'11 See id. at 13.
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to the provision or availability of air navigation services in inter-
national airspace.
Canada argued that in filing a flight plan, its pilots were exer-
cising due regard, which was an act of international comity.8 6
not creating any international contractual obligations.
Canada further argued that its military aircraft flying to a for-
eign state does so for the sole purpose, either in time of peace
or war, of the defense of Canada, or of maintaining, training or
efficiency of the Canadian Forces. Thus, Canadian military air-
craft perform pure acts lure imperii;'s7 again, implying sovereign
immunity.
C. COMMENTS ON THE ARGUMENTS OF THE CAA
The arguments of the CAA are certainly interesting, but we,
nonetheless, believe that these arguments have two fundamental
weaknesses. First, the arguments presuppose an erroneous in-
terpretation of the Chicago Convention. Second, they misinter-
pret certain principles of international public law.
The Chicago Convention is a multilateral treaty edicting
norms regulating public State action while also creating interna-
tional administrative structures. Article 3(d) creates an obliga-
tion by states to issue regulations requiring "due regard" by state
aircraft toward civil air navigation. The "due regard" rule is a
formal undertaking of states of normative content when issuing
such regulations. Thus, states have limited their sovereignty,
obliging themselves to a specific content when regulating. Lati-
tude of state action has therefore been circumscribed. As an
obligation, this public behavior of States is non-discretional.
The issuing of such regulations is the execution of an interna-
tional treaty obligation. By arguing that state aircraft purchase
CAA services when communicating with Shanwick, either by re-
porting their positions or filing a flight plan during peacetime,
the argument presupposes discretionary latitude of action by
states. This, in turn, implies that the registry of the flight plan
by a military aircraft during peacetime is an optional act, and
not a result of the "due regard" obligation.
A "contract" by definition is a consensual phenomenon that
presupposes the choice not to contract. Contracts are by their
very nature the execution of the free will to bind oneself to the
execution of an obligation requiring a meeting of the mind, con-
186 See id. at 12.
187 Statement of Claim T-1772-98, p. 3 para.14.3.
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sensus ad idem. Thus, the contractual interpretative paradigm
presupposes latitude of action with the freedom not to contract.
We argue that a state aircraft, when effecting an unclassified At-
lantic crossing during times of peace, does not have, and must
not have, such latitude of action to arbitrarily decide not to de-
posit a flight plan with civil air traffic authorities. The due re-
gard obligation codified in Article 3(d) of the Chicago
Convention requires states to enact due regard requiring state
aircraft to deposit flight plans in cases such as North Atlantic
crossings. Because the deposit of a flight plan and respecting
the ensuing flight separation protocols is the optimal way to ex-
ercise a treaty obligation, it cannot give rise to contractual ties.
If the contract theory is accepted, then ATC authorities could
refuse to receive flight plans or other important communica-
tions pertaining to the position of state aircraft. Such is not the
case. We proffer that a correct interpretation of Article 3(d)
obliges States to include in their air regulations the principle of
the deposit of flight plans by operating personnel of state air-
craft and the subsequent communication of their positions.
The ATC must take communications of these in administering
civil air navigation. There should be no discretion involved on
either side of the equation. Simply put, these are treaty obliga-
tions! Furthermore, civil navigation authorities are not only
obliged to accept these flight plans but also must facilitate and
encourage the execution of the due regard obligation in order
to ensure the optimum in co-ordination and safety between civil
and military flights.
We argue that accepting the CAA proffered interpretation
would unreasonably weaken the content of the "due regard"
rule. The weakening of this rule to a discretionary form of state
behavior would result in reducing the safety of international
civil aviation. The consequence of this reduction in safety is the
increased business risk, which in turn negatively affects the eco-
nomic development of the industry. The result of the CAA prof-
fered interpretation would be contrary to the objectives of the
Chicago Convention as stated in the preamble of the treaty.
The CAA argumentation should therefore be rejected as incom-
patible with the Chicago Convention and unreasonable. The
communication of a flight plan or reporting of positions by mili-
tary flights with civil air navigation authorities when passing
through international air space must remain as the essence of
the content of the "due regard" rule, and remain its preferred
method of execution of an international treaty obligation. Fur-
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thermore, the contractual model proffered by the CAA ignores
other fundamental principles of treaty interpretation.
First, treaties are to be interpreted according to the ordinary
meaning."' To displace this presumption one must prove that
the terms must be used in meaning other than their plain mean-
ing. One way of doing this is by demonstrating the unreasona-
ble consequences that a plain meaning interpretation would
yield. The CAA has failed to prove this. Another argument that
can be used to repudiate the ordinary meaning methodology is
to show semantic ambiguity. This form of argumentation can be
quite complex. Semantic ambiguity must not be confused with
the generality of terms. Ambiguity is a multiplicity of attributa-
ble meanings. Thus, for a text to be ambiguous, it must logically
and reasonably convey more than one concept. Such a real am-
biguity can justify the repudiation of the plain meaning method-
ology. 89 Reasons must be put forward to disregard the plain
meaning. This principle was clearly stated by the ICJ in the Mo-
rocco case: "If the natural sense ... yields a coherent and rea-
sonable proposition, then this proposition can only be set aside
if sufficient evidence is adduced to prove that it could not have
been contemplated." 9 '
Furthermore, within the Iranian Oil Case, the ICJ stated that
"it would require special and clearly established reasons"' 1 to
deviate from the ordinary meaning to a treaty text.
188 See The Second Membership Case, 1950 I.CJ. 4 (Mar. 3). The Court con-
siders it necessary to say that the first duty of a tribunal, which is called upon to
interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, is to endeavor to give effect to them
in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur. If the
relevant words in their natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their context
that is an end of the matter. If, on the other hand, the words in their natural and
ordinary meaning are ambiguous or lead to an unreasonable result, then, and
then only, must the Court, by resort to other methods of interpretation, seek to
ascertain what the parties really did mean when they used these words. Id.
189 As Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice wrote, "It is therefore not sufficient in itself that a
text is capable of bearing more than one meaning. These meanings must be
equally valid meanings, or at any rate, even if one may appear more possible and
likely than the other, both must attain a reasonable degree of possibility and
probability, not only grammatically but as a matter of substance and sense. Only
then, in the words of Lord McNair, will there be a 'real ambiguity in the text."'
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice
1951-54: Treaty Interpretation and Other Points, BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 203, 216 (1957).
190 Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v.
U.S.), 1952 I.CJ. 176 (Aug. 27).
19' Id. at 186-87.
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The due regard norm is not an ambiguous text. Certainly,
the content of the norm must be ascertained. Perhaps it is ill
defined, but it is not ambiguous. Considering the fact that the
CAA arguments went against a plain meaning interpretation of
the text, the burden of proof would have rested upon the CAA
to show the unreasonableness of a textual interpretation of the
due regard rule, actori incumbit probation.
Second, there exists a presumption in international law that a
treaty be interpreted "so as to give full effect to its purposes." 192
This is called the principle of effectiveness, often referred to by
courts as ut res magis valeat quam pereat,193 and is fundamental to
interpreting treaties, which are constitutive of international or-
ganizations.9 4 As Professor Amerasinghe pointed out, the prin-
ciple of effectiveness has two dimensions:
The first embraces the rule that all provisions of a treaty must be sup-
posed to have been intended to have significance and be necessary to
convey the intended meaning so that an interpretation which reduces
some part of the text to the status of a pleonasm or mere surplusage is
prima facie not acceptable - 'la regle de l'effet utile.' The second covers
the rule that the instrument as a whole, and each of its provisions, must
be taken to have been intended to achieve some end and that an interpre-
tation which would make the text ineffective to achieve the object in view
is prima facie suspect - "la regle de l'efficacite." 9
The contractual model proffered by the CAA reduces the ef-
fectiveness of the due regard norm in contradiction with both of
the above cannons of treaty interpretation.
The alternate argument proffered by the CAA, namely that of
unjust enrichment was primafacie deceptively simple. The argu-
ment is in fact complex, multidimensional, and from a tactical
perspective, brilliantly placed as a secondary argument. None-
1,2 MALANCZUK, supra note 146, at 367.
193 Briefly stated, according to this principle, "[t]reaties are to be interpreted
with reference to their declared or apparent objects and purposes; and particular
provisions are to be interpreted so as to give them their fullest weight and effect
consistent with the normal sense of the words and with other parts of the text,
and in such a way that a reason and a meaning can be attributed to every part of
the text. C.F. Amerasinghe, Interpretation of Texts in Open International Organiza-
tions, BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 175, 189 (1994); see also Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.),
1949 I.C.J. 244 (Dec. 15).
194 See Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Services of the United Nations
Case, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11); see also Amerasinghe, supra note 193, at 175-210;
R. Bernhardt, Interpretation in International Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 11 (1995).
'95 Amerasinghe, supra note 193, at 196.
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theless, this argument is also fatally flawed. The unjust enrich-
ment argument has a possible tripartite structure. First, the
argument can be justified either as invoking general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations, or second, as presenting
an argumentation of equity ex aequo et bono. Third, the argu-
ment can be justified as a principle of equitable treaty
interpretation.
First, granted, unjust enrichment is a general principle of law
recognized by civilized nations and, according to Article 38(1)
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, is a source of
international public law.196 Unjust enrichment is, however, a
subsidiary source of law to be used in the event where there is a
void in treaty or customary law. Doctrinal analysis places gen-
eral principles of law recognized by civilized nations as a useful
tool in case treaty or customary norms cannot solve the issue. As
Professors Barry E. Carter and Phillip R. Tremble authoritatively
wrote in referring to these principles: "Thus, follows, that it is the
court which has the discretion which principles of law to apply in the
circumstances of the particular case under consideration, and it will do
this upon the basis of the inability of customay and treaty law to provide
the required solution."'97
At best, international courts have shown a parsimonious use
of general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. In
fact, the ICJ has been timorous to apply general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations. References to these princi-
ples have been mainly negative, that is, to state their inapplica-
bility within its rationes decidendi.'98 For example, within the
Wimbledon Case,'99 the I.P.C.J. argued that the existence of a
treaty norm prevented the Court from applying general princi-
ples of private law, namely servitudes. Similarly, within the Right
of Passage Case, the ICJ determined that the applicability of a lo-
196 See 6 IRAN-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 149, 168-69. Unjust enrichment is "widely
accepted as having been assimilated into the catalogue of general principles of
law available to be applied by international tribunals."
197 BARRY E. CARTER AND PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 171 (3d ed.
1999); see also MALANCZUK, supra note 146, at 367 ("This phrase was inserted in
the Statute of the Permanent Court ofJustice ... in order to provide a solution in
cases where treaties and custom provided no guidance; otherwise, it was feared,
the Court might be unable to decide some cases because of gaps in treaty law and
customary law.").
98 See Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6, 43
(Apr. 12); AFFAIRE DU PLATEAU CONTINENTAL DE LA MER Du NORD DE 1969, at 21;
AFFAIRE DU SuD-OuEsT AFRICAIN 1966, at 47 (sources with author).
199 France, Italy, Japan, and the U.K. v. Germany, 1923 P.C.I.l. (ser. A) No. 1.
2001] 939
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
cal customary norm prevented further inquiry into the applica-
bility of general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
Portugal also invokes general international custom, as well as the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations, in support of its claim of
a right of passage as formulated by it. Having arrived at the conclusion
that the course of dealings between the British and Indian authorities on
the one hand and the Portuese on the other established a practice, well
understood between the Parties, by virtue of which Portugal had acquired
a right of passage in respect of private persons, civil officials and goods in
general, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine whether gen-
eral international custom or the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations may lead to the same result.z""
In the dispute between the CAA and the Canadian govern-
ment, the Chicago Convention would have provided a satisfac-
tory answer to the problem through a correct interpretation of
Article 3(d). In the case at hand, proper treaty interpretation
thus precludes the conditions required to invoke an alternative
source of international public law, such as unjust enrichment.
Second, an unjust enrichment argumentation as an applica-
tion of equity ex aequo et bono, also fails to resist analysis. The
purpose of an aequo et bono argumentation is to free the court
from the constraints of positive norms allowing a court to decide
more on the facts than on the law itself. Procedurally speaking,
the parties must a priori accept that a court can decide ex aequo et
bono. Although states have never granted such powers to the
ICJ, they have accepted this in arbitration cases.20 1 Within the
present case, Canada never expected to grant the court powers
to settle the case ex aequo et bono.
Third, and perhaps the most cogent dimension of the argu-
mentation, unjust enrichment can possibly refer to a form an
equitable treaty interpretation. 2  However, the ICJ has been
prudent in using this interpretative technique. In the North Sea
Continental Shelf Case,2 °3 the ICJ had expressed concern that
"[a]s the operation of delimiting is a matter of determining ar-
eas appertaining to different jurisdictions, it is a truism to say
that the determination must be equitable; rather is the problem
201 Right of Passage Case, 1960 I.C.J. at 43.
20) See A.J.I.L. 1039, 180; Fisheries jurisdiction (F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 175
(July 25); Trail Smelter Case, (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941).
202 See the decision of Justice Hudson, Affaire des Prises d'Eau le la Meuse
(BeIg. v. Neth.), 1937 I.CJ. 76-78.




above all one of defining the means whereby the delimitation
can be carried out in such a way as to be recognized as
equitable."
In the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case,2 °4 the ICJ insisted upon reach-
ing an equitable apportionment of fishing resources. However,
it must be noted that the ICJ wanted to reach an equitable solu-
tion based on the applicable legal norms.
Although the unjust enrichment argument is very interesting
and complex, we remain unconvinced as to its cogency. Thus,
we believe that the unjust enrichment argument could not have
been accepted and would have been rejected.
D. COMMENTS ON THE CANADIAN ARGUMENTS
The determination of whether these charges were in reality
taxes in international law is a very interesting and complex de-
bate. If these fees were in fact charges and not taxes, they would
then have been applicable to all aircraft. Government aircraft,
which are excluded from this definition, would have been sub-
ject to these fees. On the other hand, if these fees were in fact
taxes, then all state aircraft that are "qud' state aircraft, irrespec-
tive of their Chicago-type classification, would be exempt from
these charges on the grounds of sovereign immunity. We, how-
ever, proffer that a debate on this issue is not necessary to re-
solve the dispute. The case at issue can be solved avoiding the
tax polemic through our proffered interpretation of Article
3(d). The definition of what is a tax in international law is be-
yond the scope of this paper.205 Nonetheless, if these fees were
in fact taxes, then the sovereign immunity of state aircraft pre-
cludes the imposition of these taxes against military aircraft.
Canada correctly denied the creation of a contractual link
when its state aircraft deposit flight plans. The important issue
to determine is if a contractual obligation arises when military
pilots with international air traffic control authorities deposit a
flight plan. If this question were answered affirmatively, then
state aircraft would be obliged to pay for services duly consumed
by contract. The answer to this question necessarily presup-
poses both the purposes for which one deposits the flight plans
and the basic theory of state contractual relations.
204 Fisheries Jurisdiction (F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 175 (July 25).
205 Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that in Resolution A12-19, the ICAO
Assembly describes the amounts that states may collect based on Article 15 of the
Chicago Convention as taxes.
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Canada's argument stressed the lure imperii concept. We be-
lieve that the maintenance of a broad interpretation of lure im-
perii to military aircraft functions is important. A restrictive
interpretation of the concept of military aircraft could nega-
tively affect U.N. charter rights, such as those established con-
cerning inherent right of state to self-defense. 21' The
interpretative balance of Article 3(b) thus becomes very deli-
cate. The enumerations as a whole must be interpreted restric-
tively inasmuch as this treaty disposition deals with a tripartite
classification of State aircraft consisting exclusively of military
customs and police air services. Nonetheless, the military part
of the norm in itself must be subject to a broad
interpretation.0 7
Canada's argument on international comity must be reviewed.
Comity, or Comitas Gentium, Convenance et Courtoisie Internatio-
nale, Staatengunst, are "rules of politeness, convenience, and
goodwill, "2' 0 "neighborliness, mutual respect, and the friendly
waiver of technicalities. ''2""t These are not rules of law and are
therefore, not legally binding. However, in the case at hand, the
"due regard" was a treaty obligation specifically involving techni-
cal rules for the international safety of civil air navigation, and
therefore, could not have been considered as a discretionary
rule of comity. To argue that states deposit a flight plan as an
act of comity would be to void the due regard treaty obligation
of normative content. Granted, a rule of comity can evolve to a
customary norm, or be codified within a treaty, but this is not
the case. We believe that this second argument involving comity
is wrong and must be refused as being contrary to the stated
goals of the Chicago Convention. Therefore, we argue that this
interpretation should be rejected as unreasonable.
Article 15 of the Chicago Convention implicitly allows states
to impose certain charges or fees for the use of airport services
and facilities or other services provided to aircraft. However, Ar-
ticle 15 cannot be interpreted as authorizing states to impose
201 See UN CHARTER, art. 51; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities In and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (for the relationship
between the conventional right of self defense and its customary version).
207 For an excellent review on the right of states to defend themselves, see AL-
BRECHT RANDELZIOFER, ARTICLE 51 IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 106 (Bruno Simma et al. eds. 1995).
208 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, A TREATISE 34 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th
ed., 1991).
209 BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 30.
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charges on foreign state aircraft. Article 15 must not be inter-
preted in isolation. The Chicago Convention, within Article
3(c), expressly reserves to the contracting states all questions re-
lating to authorization for operation of foreign state aircraft.
Furthermore, article 3(a) specifically edicts the scope of applica-
bility of the Chicago Convention, limiting it to civil aircraft. Ar-
ticle 15 must therefore be interpreted in conjunction with
Article 3(a). According to Professor Cooper, who was chairman
of the drafting committee that included Article 3 and com-
mented when explaining the exclusion of state aircraft in the
negotiations of the Chicago Convention: "The position taken at
that time was that military aircraft ... had the character of a political
organ removed from every intervention by another power as had a foreign
warship in a national port."12
1
Thus, not only does the Chicago Convention disallow states to
impose fees to state aircraft, but also customary international
law prohibits such charges. The Chicago Convention does not
have any disposition that specifically changes this customary
norm. Like warships, military aircraft have, as a matter of inter-
national custom, enjoyed treatment that differs from that of
their civilian counterparts. Furthermore, due to the fact that
military aircraft benefits from sovereign immunity, military air-
craft likewise have a special status under international public
law.
Furthermore, the focus Article 15 of the Chicago Convention
seems to create a level playing field among commercial flight
operators. Article 15 prevents fee discrimination based on na-
tionality concentrating on anti-competitive behavior. A mecha-
nism assuring transparency of fee structures is also established
in the last paragraph of Article 15 with the publication and com-
munication requirements to ICAO. The concerns expressed
within Article 15 are therefore, not pertinent to the operation of
state aircraft. Any attempt to use Article 15 to justify the charg-
ing of fees to state aircraft would change the nature and focus of
the article and negate the intellectual integrity of the treaty.
Granted, user charges are a recognized and well-accepted
method to obtain revenue from aircraft operating within a com-
mercial paradigm to cover costs associated with aviation and air-
port facilities and services. However, the principle of the
inherent equality of a sovereign underlies the argument that
210 COOPER, supra note 24, at 242-43. The convention as a whole, with the ex-
ception of Article 3c and (d), is applicable only to civil aircraft. See id. at 306.
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governments should not assess charges on other governments.
A fundamental principle of international law is that the property
of a sovereign used for non-commercial purposes is not subject
to seizure, attachment, or execution to satisfy a debt.21' None-
theless, if a state aircraft receives certain goods and services,
such as fuel, aircraft maintenance, or other supplies, then these
certainly should be paid for. Furthermore, the CAA was in the
case, disregarding U.K's responsibility to provide ATS in the
Shanwick F.I.R.
As a final comment on this very interesting case, we will briefly
discuss the role of Canadian courts in treaty interpretation.21 2
Within the Canadian constitutional structure, most treaties are
implemented by legislation. 21 3 Generally speaking, our execu-
tive branch makes treaties and our legislative branch imple-
ments treaties. Strictly speaking, Canadian courts interpret
domestic laws, not international treaties. Nonetheless, in a re-
cent decision,21 4 the Supreme Court of Canada tackled such an
issue. According to Justice Gonthier:
The first comment I wish to make is as follows:
In interpreting legislation which has been enacted with a view towards
implementing international obligations . .. it is reasonable for a tribu-
nal, to examine the domestic law in the context of the relevant agreement
to clarify any uncertainty. Indeed where the text of the domestic law lends
itself to it, one should strive to expound an interpretation which is consis-
tent with the relevant international obligations.
Second, and more specifically, it is unreasonable to make reference to
an international agreement at the very outset of the inquiry to determine if
there is any ambiguity, even latent, in the domestic legislation. The Court
of Appeal's suggestion that recourse to an international treaty is only
available where the provision of the domestic legislation is ambiguous on
its face is to be rejected.
Justice Gonthie, then cites Ian Brownlie:
If the convention may be used on the correct principle that the statute is
intended to implement the convention then, it follows, the latter becomes a
proper aid to interpretation, and more especially, may reveal a latent am-
biguity in the text of the statute even if this was "clear in itself.'" Moreo-
211 See The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
21 An exhaustive analysis of the role of Canadian courts in treaty interpreta-
tion is beyond the scope of this article.
213 One possible exception is the defense treaties because these do not affect
internal laws.
214 See Nat'l Corn Growers Ass'n v. Canada (Canadian Import Tribunal), 2
S.C.R. 1324 (Can. 1990).
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ver, the principle or presumption that the Crown does not intend to break
an international treaty must have the corollary that the text of the inter-
national instrument is a primary source of meaning or "interpretation."
The courts have lately accepted the need to refer to the relevant treaty even
in the absence of ambiguity in the legislative text when taken in
isolation.215
Within its argumentation, the CAA bases its rights on internal
Canadian laws, not on the Chicago Convention per se. How-
ever, in interpreting the Canadian laws which edict that Cana-
dian military flights are to deposit flight plans with the CAA, the
Federal Court must do so in light of the Chicago Convention
because these domestic Canadian laws are the implementation
of the due regard treaty obligation of Canada.2 16
Due regard is a broad concept, which is difficult to define.
However, generality of the terms is not in itself an impediment
to interpretation or to its applicability in examining Canadian
laws. As J.E.S. Fawcett appropriately wrote on the subject:
... a treaty or agreement is recognized as having its own special status
and function as an instrument of international laws. Therefore, to the
extent that the first principle of the primacy statute does not operate in a
particular case, the agreement will be construed by the canons designed to
make it as effective as possible in its field of operation.
A classical statement of these canons is to be found in a Privy Council
judgment delivered by Lord Sumner. The interpretation of an interna-
tional agreement, must he said, take note of the fact that it is expressed in
what is by tradition the common language of international intercourse,
but it would be unreasonable in the circumstances to expect of it either
nicety of scholarship or exactness of literary idiom... Where interests con-
flict much must be allowed to the effects of compromise; where the princi-
ples, by which future action is to be guided, are laid down broadly,
leaving to the Powers concerned the actual measures to be taken in execu-
tion of those principles, it is unreasonable to expect a greater precision
than the circumstances admit of or to reject as incomplete provisions
which are expressed without much detail and sometimes only in
outline.2 1
7
Another interpretive hurdle, however, still remains to be over-
come. The Canadian laws obliging the deposit of flight plans
2 15 BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 51.
216 See Schavernoch v. Foreign Claims Comm'n, 136 D.L.R. 447 (Can. 1982).
The Supreme Court of Canada examined similar issues pertaining to regulations
implementing international agreements expressing an opinion consistent with
the present argument.
217 J.E.S. FAWCETr, THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 66-68
(1963).
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for military transatlantic flights do not specifically mention that
this is done in implementation of a treaty obligation. Thus, can
a court refer to a treaty in interpreting a domestic law if no men-
tion of the implementation of the treaty in question appears
within the law to be interpreted? This issue was directly ad-
dressed in Pan-American Airways v. Department of Trade,2 ' where
in the words of Justice Scarman, L.J., a court may take notice of
an international convention when two courses are reasonably
open to the court, but he stated:
One would lead to a decision inconsistent with Her Majesty's interna-
tional obligations under the convention while the other would lead to a
result consistent with those obligations. If statutory words to be construed
or a legal principle formulated in an area of the law where Her Majesty
has accepted international obligations, our courts - who, of course, take
notice of the acts of Her Majesty done in the exercise of her sovereign
powers - will have regard to the convention as part of the full content or
background of the law. Such a Convention, especially a multilateral one,
should then be considered by courts even though no statute expressly or
impliedly incorporates it into our law.2' 9
Thus, the omission of reference to the Chicago Convention
does not preclude the court from referring to the treaty in inter-
preting domestic Canadian laws.
V. UNAUTHORIZED OVERFLIGHT
What would be the legal repercussions of an unauthorized
overflight of a state by a military or state aircraft? On August 2,
1975, Air Force One was carrying President Ford and received
clearance to fly over Sweden en route from Helsinki to
Bucharest. Unfortunately, the plane strayed to the east over the
restricted area of Karlskroma and was quickly intercepted by a
Swedish fighter.220 If a military aircraft entered the sovereign
airspace of another state without proper authorization, the tres-
passing aircraft could be intercepted and identified, directed to
leave, forced to land at a designated airfield, or ultimately have a
warning shot fired, and, if necessary, have its flight terminated.
211 Lloyds Rep. 257, 261 (1976).
219 [d.
220, SeeJ. Sundberg, Legitimate Responses to Aerial Intruders, The Viez from a Neutral
State, in 10 ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACiE LAW (Nicholas Mateesco Matte, ed., 1955);
see also M. Milde, Interception of Civil Aircraft vs. Misuse of Civil Aviation, in 11 AN-
NALS OF AIR AND SPACE LAw (Nicholas Mateesco Matte, ed., 1986); B.E. Donahue,
Attacks on Foreign Civil Aircraft Trespassing in National Airspace, 30 A.F. L. REV. 49-68
(1989).
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The response of the overflown state must respect the basic
norms pertaining to the use of force in international law.
Indeed, the use of force against the military or state aircraft
during such violations is a delicate question in peacetime. The
rules of proportionality, military necessity, humanity, and chiv-
alry would govern the use of force in a situation 221 where a state
invokes its right to self-defense 222 to justify the downing of an
aircraft during peacetime.
Nonetheless, it is important to stress that Article 3(b) of the
Chicago Convention,2 23 which was drafted and codified as a con-
sequence of the regrettable Soviet interception and destruction
of Korean Air Flight 007 in September 1983, codifies customary
peacetime norms prohibiting the use of force against civil air-
craft. Again, a state aircraft, which includes military aircraft, is
not subject to this treaty disposition. Nonetheless, according to
U.S interpretation of customary law, with which we agree, inter-
national law establishes similar normative standards to those ap-
221 Proportionality is a customary norm of international law pertaining to the
use of force during an armed conflict by states. It was codified in the 1977 Proto-
col Additional I to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, June 8 1977, arts. 51.5 (b)
and 57.2(iii). Proportionality balances the military advantage anticipated from
the use of force with the collateral damages to civilian and civil objects. In other
words, the collateral damage caused by the use of force must not be dispropor-
tionate to the military advantage sought. For a history of the principle of military
necessity in American law, see Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of
War: The Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT'L L.
213 (1998); see also William Gerald Downey, Jr., The Law of War and Military Neces-
sity, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 251 (1953); Judith G. Gardam, Proportionality and Force in
International Law, 87 Am.J. INT'L L. 391 (1993); Oscar Schacter, The Right of States
to Use Force, 82 MIcii. L. REv. 1620 (1984); T.K. Plofchan, Article 51; Limits on Self-
Defense?, MiciH. L. REv. 336 (1992). For a more general analysis of the LOAC
applicable to air warfare, see Hamilton de Saussure, Recent Developments in the
Laws of Air Warfare, ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 33-47; L. C. Green, Aerial Considerations
in the Law of Armed Conflict, 5 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 89-117 (1980).
222 An act of self-defense must always be both necessary and proportional.
"There is a specific rule whereby self-defense would warrant only measures which
are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well
established in customary international law." Legality of the Threat or Use of Nu-
clear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8) (quoting Military and Paramilitary Activi-
ties In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 94 (July 8)). See also,
IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 279 (1981).
223 Protocol relating to an amendment to the Convention on International
Civil Aviation (Article 3 bis), Montreal, 10 May 1984, 23 I.L.M.. This protocol has
not been submitted to the Senate for advice and consent because of concerns
about compulsory ICJ jurisdiction. See The Commander's Handbook, supra note
21, at para. 4.4 n. 35.
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plicable to civil aircraft with respect to military aircraft
interception124 when the military aircraft trespasses national air-
space by reasons of error, distress, or force majeur.225 In this case,
the use of force against the trespassing state aircraft could gen-
erate state liability. For example, when an American military air-
craft that was over the Behring Straight accidentally penetrated
Soviet airspace because of bad weather on June 22, 1955, Soviet
planes, in which 11 members of the crew were wounded, inter-
cepted it. The Soviet Union later paid 50% of the damages to
the airplane and crew, which amounted to $724,947.226 The
overflight of sovereign territory by a state aircraft can be justified
by reasons of distress or force majeure as an exception to the prin-
ciple edicted in Article 3 of the Chicago Convention. Elemen-
tary considerations of humanity not only prevent the use of
force in such situations, but also override claims of violation of
sovereign airspace.
VI. U.S. DOMESTIC LAW
Article 12 of the Chicago Convention created an obligation
for contracting states to enact rules of the air, ensuring that the
operation of an aircraft within its territory shall comply with na-
tional air traffic rules, or with Annex 2, when operating over the
high seas. The United States government executed this duty in
Title 14, Part 91 of the Code of Federal Regulations, requiring
that operators of an aircraft comply with American operating
rules when within American sovereign air space, and that U.S.
registered aircraft respect Annex 2 when over the high seas.227
This norm only applies to civil aircraft. Nonetheless, the Ameri-
can government agreed that American state aircraft, while oper-
ating in international airspace, should do so with due regard for
the safety of civil aircraft. This position is in conformity with
Article 3(d) of the Chicago Convention.228 Thus, a military air-
craft, being a state aircraft, while on military maneuvers in inter-
national airspace over the high seas, is not legally bound by
224 See William J. Hughes, Aerial Intrusions by Civil Airliners and the Use of Force, 45
J. AIR L. & COMM. 595 (1980);John T. Phelps, Aerial Intrusions by Civil and Military
Aircraft in Time of Peace, 107 MIL. L. REV. 255 (1985).
225 See The Commander's Handbook, supra note 21.
226 MArre, supra note 44, at 140.
227 14. C.F.R. § 91.703 (2001).
228 Chicago Convention, supra note 23, at art. 3(d) ("The contracting states
undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft that they will have due
regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.").
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international convention to follow ICAO flight procedures for
certain operations, but must, nonetheless, operate under "due
regard" of civil aviation during such time.
The DOD has issued policies pertaining to the use of ICAO
procedures and military operations over the high seas.2 29 All
U.S. military aircraft operating over the high seas are en-
couraged to use ICAO flight rules. A military aircraft operating
in international airspace over the high seas is not legally subject
to the jurisdiction and control of air traffic control authorities of
another state. According to the DOD directives, military aircraft
flights are to avoid conflicting with national regulations. Thus, a
routine point-to-point U.S. military flight will respect ICAO
rules. DOD policy conforms to the aforementioned Article 3(d)
of the Chicago Convention, stating that military aircraft flights
and all firings shall be done with "due regard" to the safety and
navigation of civil aircraft. Furthermore, DOD directives in-
structs American military air operations in international air
space to respect ICAO rules, unless these rules are not practical
or contrary to mission accomplishment. 2-0
VII. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY AIR OPERATIONS
The freedom of navigation on the high seas is a long estab-
lished right within the corpus of maritime law. The Permanent
Court of International Justice established in the Steamship Lotus
Casea3' an initial definition of the freedom of navigation over the
high seas, arguing that due to the absence of territorial sover-
eignty over the high seas, states could not purport to exercise
jurisdiction over foreign vessels when on the high seas. This is-
sue has been recently addressed in a decision by the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.232 The cause in question
229 These are stated in DOD Flight Information Publication (FLIP), General
Planning, Chapter 6, ICAO; and Chapter 7 Operations and Firings Over the
High Seas.
230 "Operations not conducted under ICAO flight procedures are conducted
under the 'due regard' or 'operational' prerogative of military aircraft, subject to
one or more ... conditions ... [which] ... provide for a level of safety equivalent
to that normally given by ICAO ATC agencies. Flight under these provisions shall
be regarded as deviations from normally accepted operating procedures and
shall not be undertaken routinely." See Warning Areas and Offshore Airspace, 99-3
AIR TRAFFIc BULL. 11 (1999), available at http://www.faa.gov/ATPubs/ATB/99-3.
htm.
231 The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 25 (Sept. 7).
232 Article 298 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea allows states,
when signing, ratifying, or acceding to the Convention, to make a declaration in
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is the M/V "Saiga" (No. 2) Case, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v.
Guinea. In rallying with the majority, Justice Laing wrote a sepa-
rate opinion. Within this opinion, Justice Laing, eloquently ana-
lyzed the bases of the freedom of the high seas. Justice Laing
wrote the following:
• . . the institution of freedom of navigation is that it is sub-
sumed under the freedom of the high seas, which is itself based
and dependent on a broader freedom of maritime communica-
tion and intercourse, given the fact that the sea is essentially an
indispensable global highway."' 3
... propositions that freedom of the high seas and related free-
doms subserve the needs of international trade and commerce
and that they have been, and remain, an indispensable factor in
the development of the world economy and international
commerce.
234
Justice Laing further argues that freedom of navigation is a
"peremptory norm of the laws of nations," citing the Corfu Chan-
nel Case. By analogy, this reasoning can easily be applied to air
navigation over the high seas. Justice Laing states that this norm
is "[a]n obligatory binding norm; a fundamental principle,
which has also had great influence on the other branches of
international law, particularly space law and the regime of the
Antarctic Treaty, and a fundamental principle on international
law as a whole. 23 5
Transatlantic air routes are an indispensable global highway.
Furthermore, freedom of air navigation is a necessary subsection
of the norm of freedom of communication and intercourse. Jus-
tice Laing traces the establishment of this norm to the Atlantic
Charter and the post WWII legal system,236 of which it is impor-
tant to note the Chicago system is an integral part. Parentheti-
cally, the freedom of air navigation over the high seas is not only
an important part of the Chicago system, but also is an impor-
tant part of the Law of the Seas having been codified in Article
writing to the effect that it does not accept procedures for disputes concerning
military activities, including military activities by government vessel and aircraft.
This right was exercised by Cape Verde, France, Italy, the Russian Federation,
and Tunisia. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note
37.
233 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: MN "Saiga" No. 2 Case (St. Vincent
v. Guinea), 38 I.L.M. 1323, 1404, para. 21 (1999) (opinion of Justice Laing).
234 Id. at para. 23.
235 Id. at para. 27.
236 Id. at para. 28.
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87(a) and (b),23 7 establishing the freedoms of navigation and
overflight on the high seas. Within the exclusive economic
zone, these rights are to be exercised, with due regard according
to Article 58(3).238
It is important to note that international airspace over the
high seas is also subject to certain rules based on a state's right
to defend itself.23" To argue that state aircraft is free to fly over
the high seas as they wish would not only be simplistic but also
erroneous. However, considering the importance of air naviga-
tional rights over the high seas, military operators must, when
planning military air operations that affect air routes over the
high seas, exercise due regard for these important rights. This
section will analyze the application of due regard during mili-
tary operations which can affect international civil aviation.
A. SUA
American laws create six types of "special use airspace" areas,
which are also known as SUA's. One of these SUA's is called a
"warning area. ' 24" A "warning area" air space may contain vari-
ous types of military air operations ranging from aerial gunnery,
bombing, aircraft carrier operations, naval gunfire, missiles, ra-
dio jamming, all of which are certainly harmful to both civil and
state aviation. These warning areas are usually situated in inter-
237 See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 37.
238 This freedom of overflight is of great importance to military operations.
According to the U.S. Department of State Report, the U.N. Convention specifi-
cally preserves and elaborates the rights of military and commercial navigation
and overflight in areas under coastal State jurisdiction and on the high seas be-
yond. It guarantees passage for all ships and aircraft through, under and over
straits used for international navigation and archipelagos. It also guarantees the
high seas freedoms of navigation, overflight. LOS Press Statement, supra note 78.
239 See U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
240 Originally, warning areas were only designated over international waters
(beyond the former 3-nautical-mile (NM) limit). When the President extended
the territorial sea out to 12NM, the airspace between 3 and 12 NM from the coast
was no longer considered international airspace. This immediately caused many
existing warning areas to lie partly within domestic airspace, instead of being
located totally within international airspace, as called for by the warning area
establishment criteria. The issue was further complicated by the FAA's extension
of controlled airspace (Class E and Class A) and Part 91, operating rules out to 12
NM because this would have prohibited the DOD from conducting hazardous
activities in that 3 to 12 NM segment without either an exemption to the regula-
tions, or the designation of another type of SUA. This situation would have ad-
versly impacted military training and/or prevented access by nonparticipating
aircraft to airspace where they have freely operated for years. See Warning Areas
and Offshore Airspace, supra note 3, at 11.
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national airspace. According to present international air law
structures, a state does not have the legal capacity to prevent
flights within warning areas. The purpose of a warning area is to
warn nonparticipating aircraft, civil or state, of the probable
danger that they might face if they enter the warning area
airspace.
B. MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONES
During times of armed conflict, belligerents can establish a
maritime exclusion zone. The effect of such zones is to deny or
restrict access not only to ships, but also to aircraft of states,
which are not parties to the conflict. The establishment of such
a zone must be publicly declared. Thus, the establishment of
any zone that has the potential of affecting civil air navigation
must be notified through the appropriate diplomatic channels
to ICAO.241 If an airplane enters such a zone, it runs the risk of
being attacked. According to the principle of proportionality,
such a zone must not exceed what is required for military neces-
sity. For example, during the Falklands conflict, Argentina es-
tablished a 200-mile zone around the Falklands. 24 2  In
establishing such zones, due regard must be given to neutral air-
planes, ensuring their legitimate use of international airspace.
Thus, the party establishing the said zone must assure safe pas-
sage of airplanes through these zones. This is of particular im-
portance if the zone affects international air routes.243 In this
case, belligerents must take necessary measures so that aircraft
not involved in the conflict may pass through the zone with min-
imal risk.244
C. BLOCKADES
The establishment of blockades can also affect civil air naviga-
tion. In order for a blockade to be binding, it must be effec-
241 San Remo Manual, supra note 66, at Expl. § 106.6.
242 Id. at Expl. § 106.2 (This zone was "probably adequate but its declaration
that the entire South Atlantic was a war zone was disproportionate to its defence
requirements and would affect shipping unconnected with the conflict.").
243 Office of the Judge Advocate General, B-GG-005-027/AF-020 The Law of
Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level § 13 (Oct. 1999), available at
http://www.dnd.ca.jag/operationale.html (necessary safe passage through the
zone for neutral vessels and aircraft shall be provided: where the geographical
extent of the zone significantly impedes free and safe access to the ports and
coasts of a neutral state in other cases where normal navigation routes are af-
fected, except where military requirements do not permit).
244 San Remo Manual, supra note 66, at § 106.3.
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tive. 45 When a blockade is established, the party establishing
the blockade must notify all states of its commencement, dura-
tion, and location. ICAO should be notified of blockades that
affect international air navigation. According to the 1923
Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare, a private aircraft is open to visit
and search and to capture by belligerent military aircraft.2 46 It is
interesting to note that these draft rules also stipulated that pub-
lic nonmilitary aircraft and private aircraft could be ordered to
alight for visit and search, 247 but that neutral public non-military
aircraft, other than those that are to be treated as private air-
craft, are subject only to visit for the purpose of verification of
their papers.2 48 A civil aircraft can be captured if, after a visit
and search, it has been determined that they:
(a) Are carrying contraband;
(b) Are on a flight especially undertaken with a view to the trans-
port of individual passengers who are embodied in the armed
forces of the enemy;
(c) Are operating directly under enemy control, orders, charter,
employment, or direction;
(d) Present irregular or fraudulent documents, lack necessary
documents, or destroy, deface or conceal documents;
(e) Are violating regulations established by a belligerent within
the immediate area of naval operations; or
(f) Are engaged in a breach of blockade.24" '
D. ADIZ
Some States have established "air defense identification
zones" in international air space.21" These zones are unilaterally
established by domestic or municipal law and can extend several
45 Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, art. 4, available at
http://www.lib.byu.edu/-rdh/wwi/1914m/geneI856.html.
246 This treaty was never signed but "at the time of their conclusion they were
regarded as authoritative." SeeADAm ROBERTS AND RICIARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS
ON THE LAws OF WAR 138 (3d ed. 2000).
247 See Hague Draft Rules, supra note 26, at art. 50.
248 Id. at art. 51.
249 San Remo Manual, supra note 66, at § 153.
250 These are be defined as follows in 14 C.F.R. § 99.3:
(a) The Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) is an area of air-
space over land or water in which the ready identification, location,
and control of civil aircraft is required in the interest of national
security.
(b) Unless designated as an ADIZ, a Defense Area is any airspace
of the United States in which the control of aircraft is required for
reasons of national security.
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hundred miles over the high seas. Although these zones are not
based on any specific treaty dispositions, they are nonetheless
consistent with the Chicago Convention. 25' These zones are
necessary to the proper defense of States.252 We believe that
these zones have been legitimized by state practice. 25- Nonethe-
less, the application of ADIZ rules to the flight of an aircraft
whose flight path would be from one area of the high seas to
another simply transiting through an ADIZ could be
problematic.54
E. U.N. CHARTER EXCEPTIONS
In principle, a state or military aircraft may fly over a foreign
sovereign territory 2 55 solely on the basis of a special authoriza-
tion from the overflown state. The only exception to this rule is
to be found within the U.N. Charter. The U.N. Charter Chapter
VII grants some limited rights of passage of military aircraft
through the national airspace of another Member State during
a U.N. military action.251 A Security Council decision can also
call for overflights of sovereign territory or place limits upon the
aerial sovereignty of States. In Resolution 707, dated August 15,
1991, the Security Council determined to ensure compliance
The Canadian ones are known as CADIZ, the American ones are known as Desig-
nated Air Defense Identification Zones or ADIZ. There is a Contiguous ADIZ for
the continental USA, and a separate ADIZ for Alaska (for Alaska this is also re-
ferred to as a DEWIZ Distant Early Warning Identification Zone. See 14 C.F.R.
§ 99.4. For Guam and Hawaii, see Part 99 Security Control of Air Traffic, 14
C.F.R. § 99 (2001); see also Air Defense Identification Zones: CreepingJurisdiction in the
Airspace 18 VA.J. INT'L LAw 485 (1978). Furthermore, "[a]ll of the airspace of the
United States is designated as Defense Area except that airspace already desig-
nated as Air Defense Identification Zones." 14 C.F.R. § 99.49. The deposit of a
flight plan is required before an aircraft may be flown either into, within, or
across an ADIZ. 14 C.F.R. § 99.11.
25 For an excellent analysis of this issue, see JOHN TAYLOR MURCHISON, THE
CONTIGUOUS AIR SPACE ZONE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 12-18 (1955).
252 For an analysis on the possible remedies for violating ADIZ rules, see Wil-
liam J. Hughes, Aerial Intrusions by Civil Airliners and the Use of Force, 45 J. AIR L. &
COM. 595 (1980).
253 Twelve States presently maintain such air defense identification zones. See
CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 197, at 1028.
254 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 521 reporters' n. 2.
255 This includes the territorial waters of that State since aircraft do not benefit
from the right of innocent passage over the territorial waters of a foreign State as
do ships and submarines.
2-5 U.N. CIHARTER, art. 42, para. 1.
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with resolution 687 by Iraq established certain methods of verifi-
cation allowing inspection teams to use:
... both fixed-wing and helicopter flights throughout Iraq for all
relevant purposes, including inspection, surveillance, aerial
surveys, transportation and logistics, without interference of any
kind and upon such terms and conditions as may be determined
by the Special Commission, and to make full use of their own
aircraft and such airfields as they may determine are most appro-
priate for the work of the commission.2"'
As a result of this resolution, American U-2 planes flew verifi-
cation missions over Iraq to ensure compliance.
Furthermore, any decision of the United Nations Security
Council pertaining to actions included within Chapter V1258
could also permit overflight of sovereign states. If overflight is a
necessary consequence of the Security Council decision, then,
according to Article 25 of the U.N. Charter, all member states
must abide2 59 and allow the overflight. Aside from the excep-
tions found within the U.N. Charter, the guiding principle re-
mains that a state aircraft will have to receive an authorization
permitting overflight.211 Such authorization can be done either
through diplomatic communications or via a formal bilateral
agreement.
F. No-FLY ZONES
The Security Council may also create no-fly zones within na-
tional airspace. 261 No-fly zones are restrictions imposed upon a
257 S.C. Res. 707, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., at para. (e) (1991).
258 U.N. CHARTER, arts. 36 and 37.
259 "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." ld. at
art. 25.
260 Overflight above international straights is a different issue. An analysis of
air space over international straights is beyond the scope of this note. Neverthe-
less, for an excellent analysis of this issue, see G. Guillaume, Detroits Internationaux
et Detroit Aerien, 15 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 75-97 (Nicholas Mateesco Matte ed.
1990).
261 Legal justification for no-fly zones was based upon Security Council Resolu-
tions 678, 687, and 688. For an excellent analysis on the enforcement of no-fly
zones, see Michael N. Schmitt, Clipped Wings: Effective and Legal No-Fly Zone Rules of
Engagement, 20 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 727 (1998) ("One of the tools that
has been fashioned to coercively compel desired norms of international behavior
is the no-fly zone. Its use has challenged traditional notions of sovereignty, while
clarifying the operational code regarding those actions, that are appropriate re-
sponses to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression.").
Id.
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state concerning the use of its own sovereign airspace. After the
Gulf War, the Security Council was "gravely concerned with the
repression of the Iraqi civilian population '262 in both the north-
ern and southern part of the country. Massive flow of refugees
across international borders could threaten international peace
and security in the region. The Security Council called upon
Iraq to ". . .allow immediate access by international humanita-
rian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of
Iraq and make available all necessary facilities for their
operations."
As a result, no-fly zones over Iraqi sovereign territory have ac-
tually been created. These operations were baptized "Provide
Comfort," " Northern Watch," and "Southern Watch." Being a
Chapter VII operation, the consent of Iraq to the no-fly zones
was not required. Aircraft engaged in executing humanitarian
relief in accordance with Security Council Resolution 688 could,
therefore, over fly Iraqi territory without prior authorization
from Iraqi national authorities. It is interesting to note that Res-
olution 688 did not expressly create no-fly zones,263 but that
these became a necessary consequence of the said resolution.
Could future Security Council resolutions calling upon a State
to allow access by humanitarian organizations be interpreted as
creating a right of humanitarian overflight without necessarily
creating no-fly zones? Probably so, but the security of these
flights must nonetheless be assured. A Chapter VII action neces-
sarily presupposes difficulties with the subject state.
A no-fly zone was also created over Bosnia-Herzegovina to fa-
cilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid when military flights by
the warring factions over Bosnia-Herzegovina were banned.264
The Security Council expressed deep concern over abuses re-
ported against civilians in prison camps and detention cen-
262 S.C. Res. 688, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991).
263 Neither did the Resolution mention Chapter VII. Nonetheless, its refer-
ence to international peace and security is by itself sufficient as the Security
Council rarely mentions within its resolution the articles of the Charter, which
legitimises its actions. As Michael N. Schmitt cogently argues "[n]either
NORTHERN nor SOUTHERN WATCH is a classic Chapter VII operation as envi-
sioned in the Charter, i.e. a response to aggression by one State against another.
Instead, they are more closely resemble humanitarian intervention mounted by
multinational forces in response to a threat to international stability." Schmitt,
supra note 261, at 736.
214 The London Conference on the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia, Specific Decisions by the London Conference, Doc. LC/C7 (Aug. 2, 1992),
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1539 (1992).
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ters. 265 The Security Council wanted to quickly establish the
necessary conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance
in Bosnia and Herzegovina in conformity with its Resolution
764. Again, in order to ensure the safety of humanitarian
flights, the Council established a ban on military flights over
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Security Council considered such
a ban as an essential element for safely delivering humanitarian
assistance. The Security Council thus decided: ". . .to establish
a ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, this ban not to apply to United Nations Protection Force
flights or to other flights in support of United Nations opera-
tions, including humanitarian assistance. '"266
Citing Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council
decided in 1993 that the threat to international peace and secur-
ity warranted to the extension of the ban established in Resolu-
tion 781 to cover "flights by all fixed-wing and rotary-wing
aircraft in the airspace of the republic of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, this ban not to apply to flights authorized by UNPROFOR
This Security Council resolution then authorized, in the air-
space of Bosnia and Herzegovina, humanitarian flights, along
with other flights, that were to be consistent with its resolutions.
G. LAW OF THE SEA NoRMs
The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea codifies certain
norms applicable to military aircraft. Articles 87 and 58 of the
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea edict that all aircraft
benefit from freedom of navigation and overflight over the high
seas, including the exclusive economic zone. Furthermore, this
right must be exercised with due regard to the rights of all other
states. Freedom of overflight presupposes a latitude or scope of
action of movement and operation. Military operations necessa-
rily implies for aircraft, among other things, the ability of ma-
neuvering, flight operations, military exercises, intelligence
activities, and ordinance firing.
Article 33 of the U.N. Convention allows states to exercise a
limited control over the contiguous zone, an area adjacent to
the territorial sea. This control is limited to the application of
265 S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/3106
(1992).
266 S.C. Res. 781, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3122nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/781
(1992).
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customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary regulations. The con-
tiguous zone is, however, not subject to state sovereignty. Air-
craft enjoy the same freedom of navigation and overflight over
the contiguous zone as over the high seas.
Concerning Article 33, an interpretative polemic arises over
possible restrictions to military exercise, and consequently mili-
tary training overflights, occurring over the exclusive economic
zone. Exercising its rights, according to Article 310 of the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, Brazil declared that it under-
stands that the provisions of the Convention "do not authorize
other States to carry out military exercises or maneuvers, in par-
ticular those involving the use of weapons or explosives, in the
exclusive economic zone without the consent of the coastal
State." India,267 Malaysia,26-' and Pakistan 269 concurred with this
restriction of military activities in the exclusive economic zone
and issued declarations of interpretation to that effect.
Germany, on the other hand, disagreed with the Brazilian po-
sition stating, "[a]ccording to the Convention, the coastal State
does not enjoy residual rights in the exclusive economic zone."
In particular, the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State in
such Zone do not include the right to obtain notification of mil-
itary exercises or maneuvers or to authorize them.
Italy concurred with the German position and issued a decla-
ration of interpretation in support of its position. The govern-
ment of the Netherlands, also sustaining the interpretation of
Germany and Italy, cogently argued within its own declaration
of interpretation, that:
[t] he Convention does not authorize the coastal State to prohibit
exercises in its exclusive economic zone. The rights of the
2137 The government of the Republic of India understands that the provisions
of the Convention do not authorize other States to carry out military exercises or
manceuvres, in particular those involving the use of weapons or explosives with-
out the consent of the coastal State, in the exclusive economic zone and on the
continental shelf.
21 The Malaysian government also understands that the provision of the Con-
vention does not authorize other States to carry out military exercises or
manoeuvres, in particular those involving the use of weapons or explosives in the
exclusive economic zone without the consent of the coastal State.
2695 It is the understanding of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Paki-
stan that the provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea do not, in any
way, authorize the carrying out of military exercises or manoeuvres by other
States, in particular where the use of weapons or explosives is involved without
the consent of the coastal State concerned, in the exclusive economic zone and
in the continental shelf of any coastal State.
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coastal State in its exclusive economic zone are listed in article 56
of the Convention, and no such authority is given to the coastal
State. In the exclusive economic zone all States enjoy the free-
doms of navigation and overflight, subject to the relevant provi-
sions of the Convention.
The American position was clearly stated in the U.S. State De-
partment Report to the Senate in 1994, and reads as follows:
Military activities, such as anchoring, launching and landing of
aircraft, operating military devices, intelligence collection, exer-
cises, operations and conducting military surveys are recognized
historic high seas uses that are preserved by article 58. Under
that article, all States have the right to conduct military activities
within the EEZ, but may only do so consistently with the obliga-
tion to have due regard to coastal State resource and other
rights, as well as the rights of other States as set forth in the Con-
vention. It is the duty of the flag State, not the right of the
Coastal State, to enforce this "due regard" obligation. The con-
cept of "due regard" in the Convention balances the obligation
of both the coastal State and other States within the EEZ.2 7 °
This U.S. interpretation also yields an important attribute of
the due regard norm, namely that the state having jurisdiction
over the aircraft or ship has an obligation to enforce the due
regard norm. Taken in this light, the maritime due regard
norm is not an act of comity of a discretionary nature, nor is it a
contractual obligation. Due regard is a treaty obligation.
Furthermore, the U.S. State department defines the due re-
gard standard of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea as
follows:
... due regard standard required any using State to be cognizant
of the interests of others in using a high seas area, to balance
those interests with its own, and to refrain from activities that
unreasonably interfere with the exercise of other State's high
seas freedoms in light of that balancing of interests. Articles 87,
89, and 90 prohibit any State's attempt to impose its sovereignty
on the high seas; they are open to use by all States, whether
coastal or land-locked.271
Ships of all states enjoy the right of innocent passage through
the territorial sea. Nonetheless, Article 19 of the U.N. Conven-
tion defines the meaning of innocent passage, having an effect
upon ships, which are carrying aircraft. Although aircraft them-
270 For more information, see LOS Press Statement, supra note 78, arts. 33-34.
271 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 37, at art. 35.
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selves do not benefit from rights of innocent passage, this norm,
nonetheless, does have an impact on military air operations.
The meaning of innocent passage prevents the launching, land-
ing, or taking on board a ship that is exercising a right of inno-
cent passage, of any aircraft,272 any military device,273 or any
aerial operation designed for intelligence gathering.274
Aircraft, however, do benefit from the right of transit passage
through a strait,275 which is overlapped by territorial sea 27 6 and
which is "used for international navigation between one part of the high
seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or
an exclusive economic zone."277 During the exercise of this specific
right of overflight, the flight of the aircraft must be for the pur-
pose of continuous and expeditious transit in a normal mode of
operation, 78 with the exception of what may be required due to
distress or force majeure.
An aircraft that exercises the right of transit passage must re-
spect the Rules of the Air in accordance with Annex 2 of the Chi-
cago Convention and monitor the internationally designated
air-traffic control circuit or distress radio frequency. State air-
craft should comply with these safety measures and exercise due
regard at all times. 279
An aircraft must proceed without delay2'0 and refrain from
using any threat or use of force against the states bordering the
272 Id. at art. 19(e).
273 Id. at art. 19(f).
274 Id. at art. 19(c).
275 Id. at arts. 37 and 38.
276 According to the Department of State report to the Senate:
[riecognition of such a right was a fundamental requirement for a
successful Convention. With the extension by coastal States of their
territorial seas to 12 miles, over 100 straits, which previously had
high seas corridors, became overlapped by such territorial seas.
Without provision for transit passage, navigation and overflight
rights in those straits would have been compromised.
LOS Press Statement, supra note 78.
277 This right is considered by the U.S. government to be fundamental to na-
tional security interest. According to the U.S. Department of State Report, "the
United States has consistently made clear throughout its history that it is not prepared to
secure these rights through bilateral arrangements. The continuing U.S. position is that
these rights must form an axplicit part of the law of the sea. Part III of the Convention
guarantees these rights." Id. at 26.
278 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 37, at arts. 38(2) and
39(10) (c).
279 Id. at art. 39(3)(a).
210 Id. at art. 39(1)(a).
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strait.2 18 ' The exercise of the right of transit passage by military
aircraft does not necessarily preclude flights done in combat for-
mation,282 nor does it preclude the launching and recovery of
an aircraft from a ship. Flight in combat formation is not neces-
sarily, or even by itself, a threat of the use of force as articulated
within article 39(b) of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea. It must be remembered that a threat has several composite
elements, not only capacity. Intention to use force is a necessary
component of a threat. The illegitimacy of a threat lies in its
attempt to use force to affect the sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity, or political independence of a coastal state.2 3 Nonetheless,
a threat, used as deterrence in conformity to Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter is certainly legitimate. Furthermore, combat flight
formation can be seen as being incidental to the normal mode
of flight permitted in article 39(c) of the U.N. Convention on
the Law of the Sea. Finally, the conduct of a military exercise
may not suspend transit passage rights. 2 4
The right of transit passage must not be confused with the
right of innocent passage in international straits that connect
part of the high seas or EEZ with a territorial sea. In this case, a
right of overflight does not exist.285
Greece issued an interpretative declaration pertaining to the
application of the right of transit passage that can effect air navi-
gation. Greece declared that in a situation where there are nu-
merous spread-out islands, yielding numerous possible straits
which serve the same route of international navigation, then the
coastal state concerned could designate the route or routes
28, Id. at art. 39(1)(b).
282 The issue of combat formation of warships was raised in the Carfu Channel
Case. According to the orders of the British Admiralty of August 10, 1946, ships
when using the North Corfu Straight must pass with armement in fore and aft
position, which is their normal position at sea during peacetime. Carter & Trim-
ble, supra note 197, at 957. Nonetheless, according to the U.S. Department of
State Report to the Senate, "for example, submarines may transit submerged and
military aircraft may overfly in combat formation and with normal equipment
operation; surface warships may transit in a manner necessary for their security,
including formation steaming and the launching and recovery of aircraft, where
consistent with sound navigational practices." LOS Press Statement, supra note
78.
283 State parties when exercising their treaty rights must refrain from any
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 37, at art. 301.
284 Id. at art. 44.
285 One example is the Head Harbour Passage, leading through Canadian ter-
ritorial sea to the United States Passamaquoddy Bay.
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through which ships and aircraft of other nations could pass
under the right of transit passage. In exercising the right of
route determination, the coastal state would assure that the re-
quirements of international navigation and overflight would be
respected, while also assuring the minimum-security criterion
for both the transiting aircraft and the coastal state itself.
Military aircraft also benefit from archipelagic sea-lanes
passages as edicted in Article 53 of the U.N. Convention. This
right is to be exercised for the sole purpose of continuous, expe-
ditious, and unobstructed transit through archipelagic waters.
During the passage through archipelagic sea-lanes, warships may
carry activities necessary to their security, including the launch-
ing and recovery of aircraft.28 " It must be stressed that there is
no right of overflight through airspace over archipelagic waters
outside of archipelagic sea-lanes. Similar to the right of transit
passage, military aircraft may exercise the right of archipelagic
overflight in combat formation. During the exercise of the right
of archipelagic sea-lane passage military aircraft may take the re-
quired defensive measures to assure their security.2 87 Offensive
military operations against belligerent forces would, however,
not be permitted during archipelagic passage nor could these
areas be used as a sanctuary or a base of operations. This right
cannot be impeded or suspended by the conduct of military ex-
ercises.2"* Airplanes must remain within twenty-five miles from
either side of a designated axis, and must not approach a coast-
line closer than 10% of the distance between the nearest
islands. 28 19
Article 236 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea
edicts that the norms pertaining to the protection of the marine
environment do not apply to military aircraft. Nonetheless, the
flag state still has a duty to ensure that aircraft act in a manner
that is consistent with the U.N. Convention. Malta presented an
interesting interpretative declaration on Article 236, stating that
the sovereign immunity of Article 236 does not exonerate a
State from the responsibility of damage caused by pollution of
the marine environment by military vessels, including aircraft.
Although the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea places
certain restrictions on the use of force and the use of aircraft
286 See Commander's Handbook, supra note 21.
287 CF-JAG Doc. § 8-4, para. 26 (this would include acoustic and electronic
surveillance).
288 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 37, at art. 54.
289 Id. at art. 53.
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that are aboard a ship, it is important to stress that this conven-
tion does not purport to alter in any way the U.N. Charter rights
to individual and collective self-defense as codified within Arti-
cle 51. Thus, a military ship and airplane conserves, at all times,
the right to use force in self defense when exercising the rights
granted within the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Arti-
cle 19(2) of the U.N. Convention establishes that the concept of
innocent passage must not be prejudicial to the peace, good or-
der, or security of the coastal state, but does not prevent an air-
plane from defending itself if it is subject to an act of
aggression.290
The status of the Canadian Arctic archipelago has been a
source of dispute between Canada and the United States. Ca-
nada closes its arctic archipelago with the use of strait baselines.
Canada thus considers the waters within the baselines, which in-
clude the Northwest Passage as internal waters. Consequently,
the airspace above is considered by Canada as sovereign Cana-
dian airspace.2"9 ' The United States objects to the Canadian
position.92
VIII. MILITARY AIR OPERATIONAL ISSUES
Unlike most other multilateral treaties, the Chicago Conven-
tion contains a specific disposition pertaining to its application
290 According to the Annotated Supplement to The Commander's Handbook on
the Law of Naval Operations:
[S]elf defense ... is the act of defending from attack or threat of
imminent attack ... this concept relates to localized, low-level situa-
tions that are not preliminary to prolonged engagements. The re-
sponse of two U.S. Navy F-14 aircraft to the attack by two Libyan SU-
22 aircraft over the Gulf of Sidra on 14 August 1981 was an exercise
of unit self-defense. against a hostile force that had committed a
hostile act and posed a continuing threat of immediate attack."
Commander's Handbook, su/pra note 22, at § 4.3.2.2; see also U.N.
Doc. S/17938 (Mar. 25, 1986) ("The shootdown of two libyan MiG-
23s on 4January 1989 by two F-14s over international waters of the
Mediterranean Sea more than 40 nm off the eastern coast of Libya,
after repeatedly turning on them and not breaking off the inter-
cept was an act of unit self-defense against units demonstrating hos-
tile intent."); U.N. Doc. S/20366 (Jan. 4, 1989).
291 For a discussion on Canadian airspace, see Canada, Statement Concerning
Arctic Sovereignty, I.L.M. 1723, 1728 (1985).
292 Discussion of this complex issue is beyond the scope of this paper. See Agree-
ment Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of
America on Arctic Cooperation, 28 I.L.M. 142 (1988); Nicholas C. Howson, Breaking
the Ice: the Canadian-American Dispute over the Arctic's Northwest Passage, 26 COLUM. J.
TRANS. L. 337 (1988).
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during times of armed conflict. 23" The wording of Article 89 is
extremely broad and provides an interesting interpretative
quandary. A literal interpretation of this article would create
bizarre situations during times of armed conflict, allowing over-
flight of enemy territory by aircraft of a belligerent state. This
situation is inconsistent with a state of armed conflict. We there-
fore proffer that a literal interpretation of Article 89 is unrea-
sonable. To say the least, a very restrictive interpretation of this
article would probably prevail between belligerents. Nonethe-
less, Article 89 must still be read, interpreted, and applied in
conjunction with Article 3(d). Furthermore, Chicago system
rights that are consistent with a state of armed conflict would
continue to apply. Thus, a state of belligerency between States
would not suspend the obligation of combatants to execute
their missions with due regard for the safety of civil air
navigation.
During times of armed conflict, international laws governing
the conduct of hostilities impose upon combatants a fundamen-
tal obligation to distinguish themselves from the civilian popula-
tion. Military aircraft participating in belligerent activities must
therefore be clearly identified as such. Belligerent military air-
craft are legitimate targets anywhere outside of a neutral juris-
diction. 294 Rules of international humanitarian law prohibit the
attack of a disabled aircraft that has lost its means of combat, or
of an aircraft where the pilot is surrendering. There is no mili-
tary advantage to be gained by continuing an attack on an air-
plane that is clearly hors de combat. It is, however, important to
note that in air warfare, it is lawful to feign disablement or dis-
tress if the purpose of such a maneuver is to coax the enemy to
end an attack. Thus, an aircraft that appears to be disabled can
still be legitimately attacked. Nonetheless, if there is certainty
that the aircraft is so damaged as to permanently prevent it from
combat, then it may not be attacked. 95 If a military aircraft
29-3 Chicago Convention, supra note 23, at art. 89.
In case of war, the provisions of this Convention shall not affect the
freedom of action of any of the contracting States affected, whether
as belligerent or as neutrals. The same principle shall apply in the
case of any contracting State which declares a state of national
emergency and notifies the fact to the Council.
294 See Garner, International Regulation of Air Warfare, 3 AIR L. REv. 309-311
(1932); Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, International Coercion and
World Public Order - The General Principles of Law of War, 67 YALE L. J. 771, 830
(1958).
295 Commander's Handbook, supra note 21, at para. 12.6.
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lands in belligerent territory, then its military occupants have a
right to POW status, and if there are civilians or protected per-
sons on the aircraft, these must be respected.
A. MEDICAL AIRC1A.r
International humanitarian law protects properly identified
"medical aircraft"296 during armed conflict.297 The establish-
ment of certain routes and the use of the protective emblem of
either the red cross or red crescent protects medical aircraft
flights.2 98 These symbols are placed on the lower, upper, and
lateral surfaces of the airplane. 299 Aircraft may use light signals
consisting of a flashing blue light,"0 0 a radio signal,3"' or an elec-
tronic identification. 2 A radio signal identifying the aircraft
"PAN PAN" (preferably spoken three times) or "MAY-DEE-CAL"
indicates a protected medical aircraft pursuant to the 1949 Ge-
neva Convention. 303 The station addressed by such a medical
aircraft unlawfully interfered with, must render all possible assis-
tance to the medical aircraft. 04 Medical aircraft also benefit
from certain rights when landing at civil airports." 5 Approach
sequences are to be established giving priority to "hospital air-
craft or aircraft carrying seriously injured persons requiring ur-
296 The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea defines a
"medical aircraft" as "aircraft exclusively employed for the removal of the
ounded, sick and shipwrecked, and for the transport of medical personnel and
equipment." Geneva Convention II, supra note 69, at art. 39. Within the Addi-
tional Protocol I, such aircrafts are found in "medical transport." See Article 8(j).
297 See generally Edward R. Cummings, The Judicial Status of Medical Aircraft Under
the Conventional Laws of War, 66 MIL. L. REv. 105 (1974) (discussing the portec-
tion by international humanitarians for properly identified medical aircraft); P.
Eberlin, The Identification of Medical Aircraft in Periods of Armed Conflict, 1982 INT'L
REV. RED CRoss 202.
298 Geneva Convention II, supra note 69, at art. 39.
299 See id.
300 See Protocol additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for
signature Dec. 12, 1977, art. 6, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
30, See id. at art. 7.
302 See id. at Annex I, art 8; see also Chicago Convention, supra note 23, at An-
nex 10.
303 See Geneva Convention II, supra note 69, at Annex 10, vol. II §§ 5.3.3.4.1-2.
304 See id. at Annex 10, vol. II, § 5.41.
305 See id. Within the ICAO documents, the term "medical aircraft" refers to
aircraft protected under the Geneva Convnetion, Annex 10, Volume II, Section
5.3.3.4.1 and 5.3.3.4.2 Convention of 1949, and under the Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of vic-
tims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I). See ICAO Doc. 444 § 6-3.
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gent attention. '3 06 Controllers may also give special
authorization to such aircraft for use of the maneuvering
areas.
30 7
ICAO rules for the use of Secondary Surveillance Radar
(SSR) transponders are established in the Procedures for Air Navi-
gation services, Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Service °.30  The rules
presently establish a system of temporary reservations of SSR
codes to protect medical aircraft during an international armed
conflict."'" In the long term, ICAO foresees Mode S technology
for the unique identification of medical aircraft. 1 ° When neces-
sary, SSR codes are to be reserved for exclusive use by medical
aircraft operating in areas of armed conflict."' During the Gulf
War, the ICRC operated medical aircraft duly identified with
SSR. Since the end of the Gulf conflict, ICAO received requests
for SSR codes from other organizations (both public and pri-
vate), which operate humanitarian relief operations in the
area.
3 1 2
If a medical aircraft either lands, alights involuntarily, or
lands in enemy or enemy occupied territory, the crew, the sick,
and shipwrecked shall be detained as prisoners of war.3 13
A properly identified medical aircraft,3" 4 used as such, is ex-
empt from attack .3  An aircraft chartered by the International
Red Cross has the same status as a medical aircraft and can be
identified as such. 3 16 The first international treaty dealing spe-
cifically with the sick and wounded military medical aircraft was
306 ICAO Doc. 444 § 12.1.1 (b).
107, See id. at § 13.6 (b) (a maneuvering area is defined as that part of an aero-
drome to be used for the take-off, landing and taxiing, excluding aprons).
308 ICAO Doc. 4444-RAC/501.
309 ICAO Doc. 444 § 1.4.4.
3 0 ICAO Doc. AN-WP/6619, p. 2-3.
311 ICAO Doc. 444 § 5.2.3 (these are "allocated by ICAO through its Regional
Offices in co-ordination with States concerned, and should be assigned to aircraft
for use within the area of conflict.")
312 ICAO Doc. AN-WP/6619, p. 2.
'11 See Geneva Convention II, supra note 69, art. 39.
314 See Protocol I, supra note 300, at arts. 18 and 24 (each promulgates rules of
protection for medical aircraft).
35 See Louise Doswald-Beck, The Protection of Medical Aircraft in International
Law, 27 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUM. RTs. 151 (1997); Green, supra note 221; Eberlin,
supra note 297; Cummings, supra note 297, at 105-141.
3 See Louise Doswald-Beck, Vesset, Aircraft and Persons Entitled to Protection Dur-
ing Armed Conflicts at Sea, 1994 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 211, 268 (1994).
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the Geneva Convention of 1929.117 Medical aircraft had to be
painted white and had to bear the distinctive sign of the Red
Cross or Red Crescent."' Methods of warfare have greatly ad-
vanced since 1949. Aircraft can now be attacked from long dis-
tances without visual contact. Technology has reduced the Red
Cross and Red Crescent signs level of protection. New rules are
needed with infrared sensitive and perhaps even electronic "Red
Cross, Red Crescent" devices capable of interfacing with so
called "smart weapons." ' 9
During times of armed conflict, the overflight by medical air-
craft of areas that are controlled by an enemy force, and contact
zones, is restricted.1211 Military medical aircraft must follow des-
ignated routes and altitudes, and must bear a Red Cross or Red
Crescent. 2 1 A notification to the enemy of medical flights is
highly recommended and agreements can be reached assuring
the safety of medical flights. But no agreement is required for
flights over territories, not controlled by enemy forces.3 22 A
medical aircraft may, however, be seized by enemy forces if it is
discovered that the aircraft in question is in fact a non-medical
aircraft, if it has been used to acquire a military advantage, or if
317 The present Geneva system of international humanitarian law dates from
1949 and are: Geneva Convention I, supra note 69; Geneva Convention II, supra
note 69; Geneva Convention III, supra note 69; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time War, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
(Aug. 12, 1949) [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. To these four conventions,
an additional protocol was added in 1997: Protocol I, supra note 300. The Inter-
national Court of Justice ruled that these four Geneva Conventions represent
customary international law. For analysis of this decision, see Kazuomi Ouchi,
The Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: Discernible Legal Policies of the Judges of the
International Court ofJustice, 13 CONN.J. INr'L L. 107 (1998); Anne-Sophie Millet,
Les Avis Consultatifis de la Cour Internationale de Justice du 8 Juillet 1996; Liceite de
l'utilisation des armes nucleaires par un Etat dans un conflit arme; Liceite de la menace ou
de l'emploi d'armes nucleaires, 1997-1 R.G.D.I.P. 142 (1997). It is important to note
that the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocol I refer to times of war.
See Article 2 of all four Conventions and Additional Protocol 1, art/ 1.3.
318 These rules are also present in the latest Geneva Conventions of 1949. See
Geneva Convention I, supra note 69, at arts. 36 and 38; Geneva Convention II,
supra note 69, at art. 39.
319 See generally Gerald C. Cauderay, Visibility of the Distinctive Emblem on Medical
Establishments, Units, and Transports, 1990 INT'L REV. RED CROSS (discussing the
need for new Red Cross or Red Crescent signal devides).
320 Red Crescent signal devices. See Protocol I, supra note 300, at arts. 26 and
27.
321 See Geneva Convention I, supra note 69, at arts. 38-44; Geneva Convention
II, supra note 69, at arts. 41-95; Protocol I, supra note 300, at art. 18.
322 See Protocol I, supra note 300, at art. 25.
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it has flown in breach of an agreement between the belliger-
ents.3 23 In this case, the medical aircraft becomes war booty.
A medical aircraft may not fly over neutral territory without
prior authorization .1 4 This being said, it is important to stress
that a neutral power, which allows medical overflights, does not
breach the rules of neutrality. Nonetheless, the neutral power
must assure itself that these flights do not contribute in giving a
belligerent a military advantage. 25 Medical aircraft can at times
be forced to land and be inspected. 26 If an inspection reveals
that a medical aircraft is being improperly used, the aircraft can
be seized. If the said aircraft is to be used by the seizing party,
then it must retain its medical use if it was previously perma-
nently designated as such. However, if the seizing party cannot
take proper care of the sick and wounded that are on board, the
aircraft must be allowed to continue its flight.
Furthermore, the flight of a medical aircraft can be catego-
rized under the Chicago Convention regulatory system as either
state or civil. The classification will depend on the circum-
stances surrounding the flight in question. Those elementary
conditions of humanity dictate that medical aircraft be seen as
civil flights. Nonetheless, the fact remains that their Chicago
Convention-type classification has no effect whatsoever on their
protected status under the Geneva Conventions. That is to say
that a civil designated flight under the Chicago Convention is
not necessarily a civil flight under the international humanita-
rian law, which regulates the conduct of hostilities.
B. TARGETING
As a rule, a civil aircraft,3 27 properly identified as such, 28 are
not a legitimate military target and should not be attacked. 29
Nonetheless, certain situations can occur where a civil (IHL type
323 See id. at art. 30.
324 See id. at art. 31.
325 See id. at art. 28.
126 See id. at art. 30.
327 During an armed conflict it is important to note that the concept "civil
aircraft" includes a state aircraft that is not a military aircraft. These are pre-
sumed to be carrying civilians. If a civil aircraft is functioning in support of mili-
tary activities, such as troop transport, it may then be attacked.
328 See generally Horace B. Robertson, The Status of Civil Aircraft in Armed Conflict,
ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUM. Rrs. 113, 150 (1997).
329 "During WWII, civil aircraft, particularly civil airliners, were not generally
regarded as proper objects of attack by the "Allies or Axis powers." See Interna-
tional Law - The Conduct fArmed Conflict and Air Operations, JAG-USAF 4-3 (Nov.
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classification) aircraft can be legitimately attacked. For exam-
ple, a civil aircraft, escorted by a military aircraft, can be consid-
ered as a legitimate target and be legally attacked.3 ° An
unauthorized entry of a civil aircraft into a flight-restricted zone
can also be perceived as creating a military threat. At this point,
a civil aircraft can become a legitimate target. The determina-
tion of the threat resulting by the entry of a civil aircraft into a
restricted zone will, however, is contingent upon the severity
and intensity of the conflict.3 '
The Chicago Convention civil/state classification system is not
used in determining the "civil" nature of an airplane during
times of international conflict and its subsequent legitimacy as a
valid military target. The civil attribute (IHL classification) of
an airplane during belligerent times determines the legitimacy
or illegitimacy of the targeting of an airplane. It is important to
note that the concept "civil" has a different definition within the
corpus of international humanitarian law than within the Chi-
cago system. Article 52 of Additional Protocol I defines the con-
cept of civil negatively as:
1. Civilian Objects shall not be the object of attack or reprisals;
Civilian objects are all objects, which are not military objectives as
defined in paragraph 2.
2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so
far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to
those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use
make an effective contribution to military action and whose total
or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circum-
stances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage
3. In case of doubt whether an object, which is normally dedi-
cated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house, or
other dwelling, is being used to make an effective contribution to
military action. It shall be presumed not to be so used" '32
The Chicago Convention-type classification can be used as an
important element of proof in determining the "civil" concept
as used in international humanitarian law, but it is not the deter-
19, 1976); see also Eric David, Principes de Droit des Conflits Armes 2.13 (Bruylant ed.,
2d ed., 1999).
330 See Frederic de Mulinen, Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces, 1987
INT'L REv. RED CROSS 110.
I-M See generally Andreas F. Lowenfield, Agora: the Downing of Iran Flight 644,
Looking Back and Looking Ahead, 83 AM.J. INT'L L. 318, 336-341 (1989) (providing
an interesting Analysis of the downing of a available passenger plane during a
military conflict).
332 Protocol I, supra note 300, at art. 52.
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mining factor. There is an interesting difference in approach in
determining the "civil" status of airplanes between the Chicago
system and in international humanitarian law.
Within the Chicago system, the state of registry of an airplane
primarily controls the determination of its use. The classifica-
tion must respect Article 3(b) of the system. Unless an aircraft
falls within one of the three categories of State Aircraft it is a
Civil Aircraft.
Additionally, Protocol I shifts the burden for determining the
precise use of an aircraft, and thus, its legitimacy as a valid mili-
tary target, away from the state controlling the aircraft to the
state which is attacking the aircraft. In case of doubt, that an
aircraft, which is designated as civil under the Chicago system is
being used to make an effective contribution to military action,
or represents an actual threat, the said aircraft must be pre-
sumed as non-military and not be attacked.
The presumption of civilian use and the placing of the bur-
den of proof on the state which is attacking the target has been
criticized as creating an imbalance, ignoring the realities of
armed conflict, facilitating the use of human shields, and not
representing the customary law on the issue."'
Commanders must make rapid decisions during times of con-
flict in qualifying airplanes as either friend or foe, civil or mili-
tary. In determining the legitimacy of a targeted aircraft, the
following parameters can be indicative of the function of the
flight, namely:
Flight profile such as speed range, rate of climb/descent, rate
of turn, altitude, can be indicative of a military aircraft
and aggressive intent (i.e. descending and accelerating
profile towards a warship);
Emissions from fire control radar, aircraft weather radar and
radio altimeter can be indicative of a civil airliner;
Radio communications established;
Origin of the flight, (civil or military or dual use airport)
IFF mode 3 (SSR mode A) response-"-"4
33" For a discussion of the issue, see United States: Department of Defense
Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War - Appendix on the
role of the Law of War (April 1993), re/inted in 31 I.L.M. 612 (1992).
334 Report of Investigation as Required in the Council Decision of 14july 1988,
ICAO Doc. C-WP/8708, p.14.
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A radar illumination can be an aggressive act and justify the
use of defensive counter-measures. 35
The fact that a civil aircraft bears the mark of an enemy state
is conclusive evidence of its enemy character. 3 6 Nonetheless, it
may only be attacked if by its nature, location, purpose, or use it
makes an effective contribution to military action, and its total
or partial destruction, capture or neutralization will yield a defi-
nite military advantage. Also, the fact that a civil aircraft bears
the mark of a neutral state is prima facie evidence of its neutral
character. 3 7 However, any aircraft owned or controlled by a
belligerent state possesses enemy character irrespective of the
fact that it may be operating under the markings of a neutral
state .33  A civil aircraft, which bears the marks of a neutral State,
could therefore expose itself to the possibility of attack if any of
the following conditions are met:
1. the aircraft is believed on reasonable grounds to be carrying
contraband, and, after prior warning or interception, it inten-
tionally and clearly refuse to divert from its destination, or inten-
tionally and clearly refuse to proceed for visit and search to a
belligerent airfield that is safe for the type of aircraft involved
and reasonably accessible;
2. the aircraft engages in belligerent acts on behalf of the
enemy;
3. the aircraft acts as auxiliaries to the enemy's armed forces or
is incorporated into or assist the enemy's intelligence system; or
4. the aircraft otherwise makes an effective contribution to the
enemy's military action, e.g., by carrying military materials; by in-
tentionally and clearly refusing to divert from their destination,
after prior warning or interception; or intentionally and clearly
refuse to proceed for visit and search to a belligerent airfield that
is safe for the type of aircraft involved and reasonably
accessible. 39
It is important to stress that the aircraft in question must both
intentionally and clearly refuse to either divert or land as re-
quired before it is attacked.
35 According to the United States report on the investigation into the circum-
stances surrounding the downing of the Iran Air flight 655 on July 3 1988: Under
the rules of engagement "the primary responsibility of the Commanding Officer
under the ROE is the denfense of his ship from attack or from threat of imma-
nent attack." See ICAO Doc. C-WP/8708, Annex E, at 15.
333 See San Remno Manual, supra note 66, at § 112.
337 See id. § 113.
338 See Commander's Handbook, supra note 21, at para. 7.5.
3s9 See San Remo Manual, supra note 66, at § 70.
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Once radio communication is established with the civil air-
plane, its rerouting is not always a preferable alternative. In
such cases, coordination between the military authorities and
the appropriate ATC authorities is extremely important. 4 Fol-
lowing incidents over the Strait of Hormuz and the downing of
Air Iran Flight 655, the ICAO recommended that optimum
functioning of civil/military co-ordination be pursued. The rec-
ommendation includes communicating with ATS authorities
pertaining to promulgated routes, types of airspace, information
on scheduled civil flights, exchanging of real-time flight pro-
gress information delays, and information on non-scheduled
flights. 4 Thus, military units should, according to the ICAO
report, be equipped to monitor appropriate ATC frequencies
"to enable them to identify radar contacts without communica-
tion.3 42 Furthermore, in order to help their own identification
as civil airplanes, pilots should have continuous operation of air-
borne weather radars and radio altimeters. 43
Indeed, military operators must "take all possible measures to
prevent a civil aircraft engaged in commercial or private service
from being fired upon inadvertently. '344 Military planners must
be aware of air routes, flight plans, and air traffic service proce-
dures within their area of operation. 345 Civil airliners are, in
principle, exempt from attack if they are innocently employed
carrying civilian passengers in either scheduled and non-sched-
uled flights along their planned routes, and do not intentionally
hamper the movements of combatants. 3 41 If the airliner is
within the vicinity of military naval operations then it must, in
order to maintain its protection from attack, obey the orders of
34) For example, the investigation report of the Department of Defense on the
downing of Iran Air Flight 655 on 3 July 1988 relates the following: "The first
documentation of conflict between civilian COMAIR and a CJTFME unit was on
8 June 1988 when the USS HALYBURTON issued nearly continuous challenges
to an aircraft landing at Dubai International. British Airway FLT 147 acknowl-
edged the challenge, made the turn as directed by the USS HALYBURTON and
immediately came into a "near miss" situation with another civilian aircraft, A
formal protest was filed by ATC Dubai and an American Embassy letter of apol-
ogy resulted." ICAO Doc. C-WP/8708, Annexe E, para.12.
ICAO Doc. C-WP/8803 (Appendix).
342 See id.
343 See id.
'144 See San Remo Manual, supra note 66, at § 71.
.145 ICAO Doc. 9554-AN\932 (1990); see also San Remo Manual, supra note 66, at
§ 75.
346 See San Remo Manual, supra note 66, at § 56.
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the naval military commanders.34 7 Before a civil airliner is at-
tacked, military operators must assure the exhaustion of all avail-
able means of exercising control over the aircraft. 4 Thus, the
aircraft may only be attacked if diversion for landing, visit and
search, and possible capture is not feasible; no other method is
available for exercising military control; the circumstances of
non-compliance are sufficiently grave that the aircraft has be-
come, or may be reasonably assumed to be, a military objective;
and the collateral casualties or damage will not be dispropor-
tionate to the military advantage gained or anticipated.349
C. DOWNED AIRCRAFT
There is no specific multilateral treaty regulating the status of
a downed or captured military aircraft. Nonetheless, there are
customary norms that have developed on this issue.""
Whether a downed military aircraft maintains its privilege of
sovereign immunity is debatable. 5 ' Sovereign immunity must
not be confused with the rules governing the loss of proprietary
rights. Ownership of military aircraft is lost only if there is cap-
ture or surrender during hostilities. 2 Thus, an aircraft, which
has been downed (unless is downed after capture) in the territo-
rial waters of a foreign state, does not by itself transfer owner-
ship. The cause of the downing by either enemy action or
accidental-is irrelevant according to the International Law
Commission:
Current practice suggests that there is a presumption against
abandonment of title over naval or State-owned vessels, and that
an explicit act of transfer or abandonment is required. The ra-
tionale for this view lies in part in the security implications of the
347 See id. §§ 72-73.
348 See id. § 57.3(c).
349 See id. § 59.
350 See Emmanuel du Pontavice, Les Epaves Maritimes Aeriennes et Spatiales en
Droit Francais, Aviation Vol. 1 LGDJ, ENCYCLOP/DIE DALLOZ para.14 (1991)
('1aeronef perd sa nature lorsqu'il devient inapte a la navigation aerienne").
351 See U.N. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 37, at arts. 8-9; Mig-
liorino, The Recovery of Sunken Warships in International Law, in ESSAYS ON THE NEW
LAW OF THE SEA 250, 251 (B. Vukas ed., 1985).
352 As a codified example of this practice, see the Multilateral Treaty of Peace
with Japan (San Francisco Treaty), Sept. 8, 1951, art. 14(a), 3 U.S.T. 3169, 136
U.N.T.S. 45 (articulating that each of the Allied Powers "shall have the right to
seize, retain, liquidate or other-wise dispose of all property, rights and interests"
of Japan and Japanese nationals); see also J. Ashley Roach, Sunken Warships and
Military Aircraft, Department of the Navy-Naval Historical Center, available at
http://history.navy.mil/branches/orgl2-7j.htm.
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vessel or aircraft falling into the possession of unauthorized per-
sons, and in part in the desire to keep the wreck untouched as a
war grave.35 Sunken aircraft may still have unexploded ordi-
nance, hazardous, or noxious materials on board. 54
Granted, access to the downed aircraft is subject to the au-
thorization of the State having jurisdiction of the territorial sea
where the wreck is located, but there is no ownership transfer of
the wreck itself. If the aircraft is downed in international waters,
the access to the wreck is subject to authorization of the state of
registry of the sunken aircraft. It is possible to consider the
wreckage of a downed aircraft, depending upon its condition, as
a war grave. Taken as such, the wreckage may benefit by certain
treaty dispositions in International Humanitarian Law.3 5' U.S.
government policy denies permission to salvage sunken military
aircraft that contain deceased personnel or explosives. U.S. pol-
icy further affords foreign military airplanes sunk in U.S. waters
the same treatment.356
D. CULTURAL PROPERTY AND SAFE CONDUCT
Aircraft exclusively engaged in the transportation of national
or international cultural property could also benefit from spe-
cial protection during armed conflict. 57 Acts of hostility against
such airplanes are prohibited because protection is subject to
procedures authorizing special transfers.158
An aircraft can also be granted safe-conduct.3 5" This is done
by agreement between the parties during armed conflict. The
safe conduct protection applies if the aircraft is innocently em-
ployed in its agreed role, does not intentionally hamper the
movement of combatants, and complies with the details of the
safe-conduct agreement including the possibility of inspection.
The problem, however, lies in the time and manner of this in-
spection. Should the aircraft be forced to land or even rerouted
for such an inspection? It has been cogently argued that such
353 International Law Commission Report, Annex II p.9 (1996), available at
www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/1996/annex2.htm.
354 SeeJ. Ashley Roach, supra note 352, at http://prosea.org/articles-news/ex-
ploration/SHIPWRECKSRECONCILINGSALVAGE.htm
1155 See Protocol I, supra note 300, at art. 43.
356 See Commander's Handbook, supra note 21, at para. 2.1.2.2.
357 See Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, art. 12, 249 U.N.T.S. 240.
358 See id. at arts. 13, 16, 17, 18 and 19.
3,59 See San Remo Manual, supra note 66, at art. 75.
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inspections should occur before take-off of the aircraft or simply
that a representative from an independent and impartial body
be invited aboard.36 ° There is not a special emblem or signal
that identifies airplanes, which benefit from safe-conduct priv-
ileges. An aircraft that is granted safe-conduct may not use the
Red Cross and Red Crescent emblems.
IX. CONCLUSION
Aviation is a global activity operating within a shared medium
by both state and civil actors. It is in the interest of all that safety
be the categorical imperative of all who utilize the medium.
Due regard is a genus norm of international law, having a con-
ventional expression in both the Chicago system of interna-
tional public air law and in the U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea. These two treaty systems share a common approach to
the application of due regard-namely that the enforcement of
due regard is a state obligation. Within both treaty systems, the
state of registry having jurisdiction over the airplane, sanctions
the due regard norm.
The main element of due regard in the Chicago system is one
of communication among military aircraft, civil aircraft, and
ATS authorities. The primary element of due regard for military
aircraft in maritime operations is a balancing of rights of coastal
states with air navigation rights established in the U.N. Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea.
Communication is the primary fundamental regulatory pre-
mise establishing safety in our skies. Civil ATS authorities have a
reciprocal obligation to promote, facilitate, and encourage this
communicative interface.
State aircraft should be equipped with a means of communi-
cation and with procedures to interact safely with civil aircraft
and civil ATS authorities. State aircraft should comply whenever
possible with the standards of Annex 10 to the Chicago Conven-
tion. This recommendation can be very important during times
of armed conflict or during any other time when a military pilot
acts as his own flight controller. By a broad interpretation of
Article 3(d), we believe that a reasonable argument can be
presented to include a communications dimension within the
"due regard" rule. A maximum exchange of information be-
tween military operators and civil aviation authorities is a sine
360 See Doswald-Beck, supra note 315, at 268.
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qua non in air traffic management, allowing both military and
civil air controllers to cope together with unforeseen
circumstances.
The dual use of aircraft as civil and military creates an inter-
esting regulatory conundrum. From a policy perspective, strong
concerns exist as to treating civil-like military missions as Chi-
cago-type civil flights. In treating military aircraft like civil air-
craft, national regulatory agencies such as the American Federal
Aircraft Administration (FAA), for example, could claim juris-
diction over investigation of military aircraft accidents. Such in-
terference could prevent a military investigation to fully press
into a thorough safety investigation of military aircraft incidents.
Furthermore, military aircraft have classified system components
on which information could not readily be released to civil agen-
cies, thus, yielding cogent national security objections.
During times of conflict, military aviation should be bound
only by the environmental protection rules duly established
within the body of international humanitarian law.' 6
Military airplanes should be categorized in two classes, first,
those that conform ICAO standards for navigation and safety,
and second, those that do not. Only military aircraft that re-
spect ICAO standards should be allowed for dual use missions
and civil flights. Through a joint working group ICAO and
NATO could set up a proposal for an international licensing sys-
tem concerning dual use military aircraft.
As far as the discontinued CAA-Canada litigation was con-
cerned, the basis of the Canadian position was strong. Granted,
the Canadian arguments needed refinement while the argu-
ments pertaining to international comity needed to be cor-
rected. The Canadian arguments, nonetheless, had more merit
than the ones proffered by the CAA. We are happy this issue
has been amicably settled out of court, respecting the integrity
of the Chicago system. However, had this issue required a court
3i For an excellent analysis on the issue of the environment and war, see
Michael N. Schmitt, Green War: An Assessment of the Environmental Law of Interna-
tionalArmed Conflict 22 YALEJ. INT'L L. 1 (1997); Michael N. Schmitt, War and the
Environment: Fault Lines in the Perspective Landscape Archiv Des Volkerrechts 37 YALEJ.
INr'L L. 26 (1999); Wil D. Verwey, Observations on the Legal Protection of the Environ-
ment in Times of International Armed Conflict 1994 HAGUE Y.B. INT'L L. 35; Antoine
Bouvier, Recent Studies on the Protection of the Environment in Time of Armed Conflict,
291 INr'L REV. RED CROSS 554 (1992); L. C. Green, The Environment and the Law of
Conventional Warfare, 29 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 222 (1991);John H. McNeill, Protection
of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict: Environmental Protection in Military
Practice, 1993 HAGUE Y.B. INT'L L. 75.
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decision, we believe the courts would have respected the norma-
tive values established by States within the Chicago Convention
as we have argued in our proffered interpretation of Article
3(d). Although courts have the capacity to interpret treaties,
courts do not have the authority to modify treaties nor force
states into an agreement that neither intended to have.362 Ac-
cepting the CAA position would weaken the normative value of
the Chicago Convention to a point of a treaty modification.
An application of a commercial paradigm to the civil military
interface would change the entire regulatory matrix. Civil air
navigation has greatly benefited from the present non-commer-
cial paradigm.363 Military navigational assets such as the GPS sat-
ellite constellation, a property of the USAF, are presently being
used without cost by civil air navigation. The free sharing of this
infrastructure goes well beyond the requirements of due regard.
Regrettably, the application of a commercial paradigm might
force a change in this sharing.
Furthermore, it is legally and diplomatically inappropriate for
one state to levy fees amounting to taxes upon another state. In
the case of diplomatic overflight by state aircraft, the over flying
state aircraft is not on a business trip, and must receive corre-
sponding diplomatic treatment. A valid fear is that the contrac-
tual model suggested by the CAA opens the door for possible
abuses. Fees could become arbitrary and even perhaps prohibi-
tive. Humanitarian flights by state aircraft could be severely af-
fected. Charging state aircraft navigational fees would
necessarily increase the costs of humanitarian assistance. Justifi-
ably negative actions for pecuniary reasons affecting humanita-
rian aid is extremely iniquitous towards those who depend on
air delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Through our proffered interpretation of the due regard ge-
nus norm, states cannot allow their Chicago-type state aircraft to
operate in international airspace without proper consideration
for the safety of civil air navigation. If the arguments presented
by the CAA were accepted, these rules would be reduced to a
362 In the Iranian Oil case, Judge Read wrote: "It is my duty to interpret the Decla-
ration and not to revise it. In other words, I cannot, in seeking to find meaning of these
words, disregard the words as actually used, give them a meaning different from their ordi-
nary and natural meaning, or add words or ideas which were not used in the making of the
Declaration" Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.CJ. 20 (July 22); see also
James F. Hogg, The International Court: Rules of Treaty Interpretation, 43 MINN. L.
REv. 369 (1959).
363 See 1952 I.C.J. at 144-47 (Read, J., dissenting).
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discretionary contractual level. The result would be a reduction
of the safety of air traffic within international airspace and
prejudice to air traveler. The obligatory coordination, during
peacetime, of civil and military flights in international air space
by the same ATC authority is, and must remain an important
part of the Chicago Convention. Furthermore, we hope their
suggestions should be considered by the legal committee of
ICAO in order to have a formal joint study with NATO on the
status of military aircraft and ensure a proper application of Ar-
ticle 3(d) by all states.
